The Coast: Where Energy
Meets the Environment
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The United States is in the midst of an energy crunch. We are facing both fuel and power shortages.' At present rates of consumption, proven domestic reserves of oil and natural gas, our two principal fuels, may be exhausted in ten to 15 years, forcing greater
reliance on unstable foreign sources 2 Fuel supply is one of several
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1. Significant amounts of fuel are consumed in generating electric
power. Power plants accounted for 57 percent of U.S. coal consumption,
18 percent of gas consumption and eight percent of oil consumption in 1970.
N.Y. CrrY BAR, SPEcIAL CoivnmTFrT ON ELEcTRic PowER AmD r= ENVIRONmNT, Ercnmcrry AD THE ENVRoNMEnT 32 (1972).
2. FEA, PROJECT INDEPEIDENCE REPORT 17 (1974). The United States
consumes about 17 million barrels of oil per day, of which 6.3 million are
imported. Id. at 3. The estimated rate of consumption for 1985 ranges from
13 million to 25 million barrels per day. 1 CouNCm ON EvmomaTAL
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complex factors affecting power supply.3
The federal government is contemplating various ways to expand
supplies of fuel and power.4 Because the benefits and burdens of
such expansion would not fall evenly on the states, federal energy
proposals have provoked considerable controversy.
Debate has
centered on the coastal states, where the great majority of Americans live and where federal energy activity is now concentrated.
Some forms of energy development have greater impact on the
coast than others. Deepwater ports, liquified natural gas terminals,
floating nuclear power plants, and oil and gas development on the
outer continental shelf have considerable environmental and socioeconomic impact on the coast. Although fossil fuel and conventional nuclear power plants traditionally have presented coastal
siting problems, they are not coastal-dependent. Coal strip mining
occurs inland. Coal gasification and liquification, oil shale, and synthetic fossil fuel may become important sources in the near future,
but their environmental and socioeconomic impacts will be felt inland. Long-range energy sources, such as solar and wind power,
are also not coastal-dependent. Geothermal power generation will
impact the inland environment and probably not affect the coast.
The impacts of the inland programs should not be minimized.0
However, analysis of the coastal situation is necessary now because of the coastal environment's uniqueness and economic importance and the nearness in time of energy development impacts there.
This Article analyzes mechanisms for handling consequences of
the coastal dependent energy programs. Its focus is the United
States Department of the Interior plan for increased oil and
gas production on the outer continental shelf. Of the four coastal
dependent programs, this one has progressed furthest in the impleQUALITY,

OCS OIL AND GAs-A

ENVIRONmENTAL

ASSESSMENT

33 (1974)

[hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT]. We currently rely on oil for 46 percent
of our energy needs and on natural gas for 32 percent. Coal, which presently accounts for only 17 percent of U.S. consumption, represents over 95
percent of our total domestic energy resources. FEA, PROJEcT INDEPENDENCE REPORT 17 (1974).
3. See N.Y. CITY BAR, SPECIAL CoMMITTEE ON ELECTnIc POWER AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, ELECTRCmIT AND THE ENVIoONTENT (1972).
4. As the owner of over half our fossil fuel resources, the federal government has favored energy expansion rather than energy conservation
measures. See FORD FOUNDATION ENERGY PoLIcY PROJEcT, A TIMrE TO CHOOSE
399 (1974).
5. A few states are aggressively promoting energy conservation measures.
6. Strip mining damage already suffered in Appalachia is estimated at
more than $2.8 billion. ENVmoNmENTA
mENTAL LAW 997 n.478 (1974).
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mentation process.7 Deepwater ports are considered in connection
with the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, the first federal legislation
which explicitly attempts to account for national, regional, state, local, and environmental interests in energy development decisionmaking. Because the number of liquified natural gas terminals
proposed is small and the plans for floating nuclear power plants
are preliminary, no specific consideration is given their coastal
impacts. As these programs mature, the lessons learned from outer
continental shelf development will certainly be relevant.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTER C01U1ENTAL SHELF

The United States continental shelf represents a relatively untapped oil and gas source. The United States Geological Survey has
estimated that it contains as much as 150 billion barrels of oil and
900 trillion cubic feet of gas." Experts believe oil rich areas lie off
each of the United States coastlines. Current Interior Department
plans call for greatly expanded oil and gas development on the federally-owned outer continental shelf (OCS), which commences
three miles offshore.9 These plans include major tracts in the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and Gulf of Alaska.
Estimates of the Atlantic OCS oil deposits reach 20 billion barrels
of oil or 14 percent of total offshore resources. 10 However, at best,
Atlantic OCS areas could contribute only six percent of the national oil supply and two percent of the total gas supply by 1985.11
Atlantic OCS development would reduce New England's dependence on other sources, but only from 100 percent to approximately
12
70 percent.
The maximum estimate for the Pacific and Alaska OCS areas is
between 40 and 80 billion barrels.1 3 Nevertheless, petroleum selfsufficiency in the Pacific region would require in addition to Pacific
7. Tracts sold or scheduled for sale to private oil companies in 1975 are
located in the Gulf of Mexico (July), off southern California (December),
and in the Gulf of Alaska (December).
8. 1 CEQ REPORT 23-24.
9. Id. at 1. Approximately ten percent of domestic oil production currently comes from offshore sources, mostly from the Gulf of Mexico.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id. at 46.
12. See id. at 54.
13. Id. at 23.

producOCS production about 60 percent of Alaskan North Slope
4
tion, or a combination of North Slope and Alaska OCS oil.1
Thus OCS resources are small in relation to demand. Moreover,
these resources are not immediately available. Significant production will not begin until five to eight years after leasing; peak production is achieved even later. Therefore, virtually no oil will be
available from the previously untouched Atlantic or Gulf of Alaska
areas before the end of the decade. 15
In addition, OCS development is not without serious environmental and socioeconomic impacts, many of which are felt prior to any
oil and gas production. Without careful planning and regulation,
the impacts accompanying OCS development will create problems
for coastal communities that will remain long after the last drop
16
of oil is extracted from the ocean.
OCS DErV opM=T
Some OCS development activities will have minor or short-term
impacts, but others-for example, dredging and filling of wetlands,
air and water pollution from refineries, and chronic oil pollutioncan be expected to cause serious environmental damage over extended periods of time. Impacts on the coastal environment from
OCS development could in the long run be significant enough to
17
outweigh any short-run gains from exploitation of its resources.
IMPAcTS OF

The CoastToday

The Marine Environment
Marine organisms such as phytoplankton and zooplankton, shellfish, fish, marine and shore birds, and marine mammals abound in
14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 41.

16. Morgan City, Louisiana, was once a quiet coastal fishing village that

celebrated the fact that the first oil well out of sight of land was drilled
off its shore. The town now is a collection of fast food franchises, motels
and bunk house-type hotels where workers gather to drink beer and watch
a communal television set. Housing is scarce, and no effort is made on
anything except building the drilling rigs. Huge piles of rusting steel
scraps litter the roads for miles. The landscape is an industrial wasteland.
Furgurson, Offshore Oil: Not Offshore, L.A. Times, June 3, 1975, § 2, at
5, col. 4 (city ed.).
17. A committee of the National Academy of Sciences has estimated the
present value of OCS oil and gas development at $80 billion after deducting
direct exploration, development and production costs. Unfortunately the
state of the art is not such that the other economic, social and environmental
costs of OCS development can be similarly estimated. Even if they are
less than $80 billion, a similar investment in some other energy source
might yield a greater value at smaller social and environmental costs. 1
CEQ REPoRT 197.
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the coastal environment.

Kelp beds are a habitat for numerous

species of fish and invertebrates. Offshore rocks and islands serve
as breeding and hauling-out grounds for seals and sea lions and are
important nesting areas for sea birds. Bays and estuaries serve an
invaluable function as breeding grounds for fish and shellfish.L8
Though productive, the marine environment is also hazardous.
Coastal areas are susceptible to severe storms and winds. Earthquakes, natural oil seeps, and landslides are geological hazards with

serious consequences. Oil drilling rigs and platforms are not immune to these natural phenomena.
Recreation
In 1968, about $14 billion was spent by an estimated 112 million
people seeking recreation in the coastal zone.19 During 1975, visitors will spend approximately $5.4 billion for swimming, surfing,
skin diving, pleasure boating, and sport fishing alone.20 Twenty
million people engage in coastal boating, and the number of recreational boats is increasing at the rate of 200,000 per year. 21 In California, the economic return from sport fishing exceeds that from
commercial fishing.2 2 Presently more than half of all Americans
vacation on the coast.
Tourism
Tourism is a significant business in coastal regions. For example,
tourism is the third largest industry in southern California and supports approximately one million jobs. 2 The overall effect of tourist
expenditures on a region's economy is about two times the dollar
18. The biological productivity of most estuarine areas is 15-30 times that
of the open ocean and up to twice that of the best inland agricultural areas.
S. REP. No. 92-753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 4776, 4777 (1972).

19. B. KETCHUM, THE WATEr's EDGE:

CRTCAL PROBLEMS OF THE COASTAL

ZoNE 84 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WATEr's EDGE].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 89.
22. 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTwoR, DRAFT ENvIoRmNTAL STATEMENT
OF THE PROPOSED 1975 OuTER CONTINEAL SHELF O. AND GAS GENERAL
LEASE SALE OFFSHORE SOUTHERN CALIFoRNIA 624 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as SouTHERN CAFORNiA TRACT SPEcIFIC EIS].

23. Id. at 534. In 1973, an estimated 8.5 million out-of-state visitors spent
almost $2 billion in southern California. Id. at 534-35.

,amount of the expenditures. 24 Tourists pay significant amounts of
taxes while making relatively small demands on governmental
services such as police and fire protection. Tourism perhaps provides the best basis for putting a dollar figure on the scenic value
of the coast. Viewing unbroken ocean vistas, watching sailboats,
and feeling the brisk sea breeze are just a few of the special activities that make the coast so attractive.
Place of Residence
The seven largest cities in the United States are located on the
coast.25 According to the 1970 census, a population shift occurred
during the 1960's from the center of the country to the sea coasts.20
Thirty-one coastal and Great Lakes states now contain more than
75 percent of the United States population. 27 Estuarine regions,
which encompass only 15 percent of the land, contain 33 percent of
the population. 28 In the year 2000, nearly 200 million people may
live in the coastal zone. 29 Population concentration along the coast,
of course, increases the development pressures on undeveloped
coastal lands.
Industry
"[I]ndustries concentrate in the coastal zone because of transportation advantages, import and export requirements, and the need
for large quantities of water. '30 Forty percent of the nation's industrial complexes are located in estuarine regions.3 1 The significance of the California coastal zone is demonstrated by the fact that
the coastal counties from Santa Barbara south to the Mexican border produce more than one-half of the state's total goods and services.82 Commercial fishing in coastal waters is an important
industry. In 1969, United States fishermen harvested 4.3 billion
pounds of fish worth $500 million from coastal and estuarine
waters.3 3 These figures represent approximately 70 percent of the
United States commercial fishing effort. 34
24. Id. at 535.

25. WATER'S EDGE 103.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.

32. 1 SouTHERN CALIFoRNIA TRAcT SPECIFI EIS 785.
33. WATER'S EDGE 45.
34. ComviIssIoN ON MAjaiE ScINcE, ExaNEnENG AN
NATioN AND THE SsA 53 (1969).

REsouRcEs, OUR
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Land
As migration into coastal areas continues, more coastal land is
required for housing, recreation, and industry, but undeveloped
coastal land is in short supply. From 1949 to 1969, housing development destroyed seven percent of the nation's important estuarine
areas.3 5 Of the 21,724 miles of United States shoreline classified as
suitable for recreation, less than ten percent is publicly owned.3 6 Although the amount of coastal land occupied by industry will probably remain relatively small, the area affected by industrial pollutants will be much greater. Even without OCS development, if
present trends continue, the nation stands to lose large amounts of
coastal land having great recreational value and immense biological
productivity.
Offshore and Nearshore Impacts of OCS Development
Oil Spills and Chronic Discharges
Offshore drilling has occurred on a small scale for many years,
but the increasing depth of water in which wells are drilled, the
larger number of wells drilled, and the ocean-to-shore transfer of
larger quantities of oil create a much greater risk of damage to the
coastline and marine habitats. Oil spills pose the most immediate
threat to the environment. From 1953 to 1972, when nearly all
wells in the OCS were drilled, 43 major accidents occurred.3 7 The
consequences of a spill from a drilling platform or pipeline depends
on the oil composition, oil amounts, and affected habitats. In a severe spill, the offshore bottom habitats and nearshore habitats (for
example, the sand shore, rocky shore, salt marsh, estuary, and bay)
can suffer both short-term and long-term damage.
Oil spills also have significant social and economic impacts. Tourism and land values go down, reducing the local government tax
base. As a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, tourist-oriented
business in the city of Santa Barbara lost approximately $3.6 milAn additional $2.5 to $3.2 million was lost
lion in revenues.-3
35. WATE'S EDGE 104.
36. Id. at 85.

37. 1 CEQ REPORT 69.
38. See SoUTHERN CAIFORNIA COUNCIL OF LOCAL GOVERNmENTS, ANALYINSIS OF DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMVPACT STATEMENT REGARDING 'ROPOSED

through diminution in value of lands, primarily parks, owned by
the city.3 9 The State of California suffered a loss of approximately
$3.8 to $5.2 million in use values of state parks and beaches. 40 To
these losses must be added clean up costs.
In -addition to large spills, there are chronic discharges of oil from
drilling and production operations. Small amounts of oil are con41
tinuously discharged from each platform oil-water separator unit.
Other chronic discharges are drilling mud components and drill cuttings.42 Sedimentation of these discharges may harm bottom organisms and create ocean discoloration.
Interference with Fishing
The commercial and sports fishing industries will be affected by
OCS development. Fishing harbor uses may be displaced by harbor dredging and wharf construction necessary to service OCS construction, maintenance, and supply activities. 43 Of course, no guarantee exists that fishing displaced by OCS development will return
when the oil and gas resources are depleted.44 Temporary and permanent platforms, pipelines, and OCS boat and barge traffic can
conflict with fishing operations. OCS sea floor construction can
damage purse seines and trawling nets.
Wetlands Alteration
Petroleum-related development often involves construction on or
through wetlands. In this process, biological productivity is destroyed, water flow altered, and water quality degraded. Shallow
water dredging for pipelines, boats and barges increases erosion and
increase erosion
turbidity. Land clearing, filling, and resurfacing
45
and permanently destroy wetland habitats.
AND GAS LEASING ON THE OuTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF" 243 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CoUNTER EIS].
39. Id. at 254.
40. Id.
41. 1 CEQ REPORT 110.
42. Id. at 112.
43. Some 3,000 tons of material had to be transferred to each drilling rig
during the several months necessary to drill exploratory wells off Scotland.
CREASE IN ACREAGE TO BE OFFERED FOR O.

OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMIENT, NATIONAL OcEANIc AND ATMosPHERic
ADMINISTRATION,

VELOPmENT

GAS DECOASTAL MANAGEMENT ASPECTS or OCS OzL AN
COASTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE

24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as

OCS].
44. See P. BALDwIN & AT. BALDWn, ONSHORE PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE
OiL: LESSONS FROM SCOTLAND 47-66 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LESSONS
PRoM SCOTLAND].

45. Settlement and industrialization of the coastal zone has already
led to extensive degradation of highly productive estuaries and
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Onshore Impacts of OCS Development
Introduction
OCS development clearly has negative impacts upon the environment even without the oil spill threat. Onshore impacts are
especially significant in this regard. In fact, onshore activities
associated with offshore oil and gas development hold far greater
potential for long-term damage to the coastal environment than
does 'the risk of accidental oil pollution.
Although onshore development may occur prior to exploratory
drilling, 46 onshore impacts become most significant when exploration reveals developable resources. The size of an offshore field in
terms of both deposits and surface area determines the number of
platforms and supply boats required, the number and diameter of
pipelines, and the need for tanker terminals and refineries.4 7 The
environmental, social, and economic consequences of oil and gas production also depend to a great extent on the rate at which the resources are extracted. The extent of previous offshore oil and gas
development and the existing resources of the community are other
important factors in determining the nature of onshore impacts.
Onshore impacts can be classified as either primary or secondary.
Primary impacts encompass all activities necessary for development
and production of petroleum products. These activities include harbor dredging and wharf construction for support vessels, platform
fabrication, transport of supplies and equipment to rigs and platforms, construction and operation of pipelines, refineries, gas processing plants, and storage and transfer facilities. 48
Secondary impacts encompass commercial enterprises attracted to
the area by the primary oil and gas development, measures required
for upgrading transportation facilities, housing to accommodate
marshlands. For example, in the period 1922-1954 over one quarter
of the salt marshes in the U.S-.A were destroyed by filling, diking,
draining or by constructing walls along the seaward marsh edge.
In the following 10 years a further 10 percent of the remaining
salt marsh between Maine and Delaware was destroyed. On the
west coast of the U.S.A. the rate of destruction is almost certainly
much greater, for the marsh areas and the estuaries are much
smaller. S. REP. No. 92-753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), in 3 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4776, 4777 (1972).

OCS 24.

46.

COASTAL MANAGEAMENT oF HE

48.

COASTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE OCS

47. LESSONS rOM ScoTLAND 31.

23-24.

people drawn by temporary and permanent employment opportunities, and public services for all these activites. 49 The secondary impacts of OCS oil and gas development and production can be either
positive or negative. Positive impacts include increased employment, additional income, immigration of skilled labor, and increased
economic diversification. Negative impacts are rapid population
growth due to the labor intensive nature of construction work, 0 increased unemployment after initial construction work, labor shortages in non-oil industries because workers are drawn to oil by the
higher pay, development into a single-industry community, the
pressure of rapid growth on community infrastructure, and the
need for local revenues to finance increased public services before
tax-producing industries are operating.0 ' Generally, the advantages of oil and gas development accrue to the larger region involved whereas the disadvantages tend to be localized in the vicinity of the development. 52 The degree to which an area is urbanized
and economically diverse also influences the extent to which the
negative secondary impacts are felt. For a large metropolitan area,
the increased growth seems modest and manageable in terms of existing schools, hospitals and housing. But if the majority of the
new population should locate in smaller towns in the area, a significant strain is put on community services where resources are fewest.53 A sudden increase in population carries with it the potential
for social conflict, especially when the increase occurs in a small,
closely-knit rural community.
Land Use Impacts
Most OCS-related onshore activities occur in coastal areas where
intense competition for land already exists. Although in some
49. Id. at 23.
50. Oil-related developments are likely to require large numbers of construction workers for four to six years. A platform fabrication plant may
employ up to 2000 workers for two years. An oil refinery may require 2000
workers for construction, but only 300 for operation. Construction for commercial enterprises drawn to the area, transportation facilities, housing and
public services occur over a longer period of time. A Louisiana study estimates that each offshore job produces 1.7 jobs in oil and gas-related onshore activities and that each of these jobs generates 2.1 jobs in the service
sector. COASTAL MANAGEMeNT OF THE OCS 32-34. In southern California
the estimates are a maximum increase of 14,953 workers within a 15 to 20
year period, or 35,887 persons when families are included. 2 SoumznEmx
CA=FoRNA TEAcT SPEcInc EIS 216. In the eastern Massachusetts-Rhode
Island region the new employment could amount to 77,000 workers in 1985
and 83,000 workers in the year 2000. 4 CEQ REPORT ch. 3, at 18.
51. COASTAL MAAGEMET or THE OCS 29.
52. Id. at 36.
53. 4 CEQ REPORT ch. 3, at 22.
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areas there is undeveloped coastal land, not all this land is available
for development. Constraints, such as conflicting existing and
projected uses, environmental fragility, and coastal and wetlands
conservation legislation reduce considerably the amount of developable land. 54
Most of the important decisions concerning onshore facilities are
made during the development phase after exploration has discovered oil and gas deposits. 55 Sites are located for platform construction,5 6 pipeline landings, refineries, storage tanks and tanker terminals. Housing and other facilities for construction workers also
must be obtained from existing supplies or constructed as manpower requirements reach their peak during the development
57
phase.
Of all the facilities to be constructed during the development
phase, new and expanded refineries have the greatest potential impact. 58 Because high shipping costs encourage bulk transport of
54. In the proposed OCS development area of Skagit and Whatcum
Counties, Washington, the environmental and locational constraints imposed
by mountains and croplands eliminate more than 95 percent of the currently
undeveloped land in the region. 4 CEQ REPORT ch. 8, at 23, 27.
55. LESSONS

FROm ScoTLAND

25.

56. The federal Council on Environmental Quality reports that by 1985,
38 new platforms may be required on the Atlantic Coast and 19 on the
Alaskan Coast. 4 CEQ REPORT ch. 2, at 12, ch. 7, at 7. The Scottish experience suggests that platform construction is likely to occur as near as possible to the oil development area rather than at an existing shipyard. At
the outset there probably will be a shortage of skilled workers while a sizable skilled work force is trained or imported from other areas. But platform fabrication is subject to sudden and unpredictable lay-offs and buildups. Because of this fluctuation small communities are apt to experience
substantial social and economic disruption. See LESSONS FROM ScoTLA~m
67-94.
Platform construction plans for the east coast already exist. Brown and
Root, an engineering firm with extensive platform building operations in
Scotland, has proposed the location of such a facility at Cape Charles, Virginia. This firm has purchased 2,000 acres of land for $5 million. If the
project is approved, Cape Charles' experience in coping with its impacts
will be an important example for future planning. Id. at 68.
57. LESSONS FROm ScoTLAND 25.

58. Increased demand for petroleum products, anticipated supplies of
crude oil from the Alaskan North Slope, and OCS development will increase
pressure for refinery construction along the west coast. However, the Bureau of Land Management projects only one new refinery for California on
the theory that OCS and Alaskan oil will displace imported oil currently
being processed. See 2 Soummwu CAIJFORNIA TRACT SPECIFIC EIS 271. In
these calculations the Bureau has ignored its own projection of growth in
demand for California refined products. See lid. at 17.

crude oil rather than shipment of an assortment of refined products,
refineries are usually located close to metropolitan markets, where
undeveloped coastal land is in shortest supply. A typical refinery
processing 200,000 barrels daily requires 1200-1400 acres of land,59
8 million gallons of water per day, and 420 million kilowatt hours
of electricity per year.60
Other onshore facilities have adverse impacts on land use. Pipeline terminal construction near a beach or other recreation area interferes with the use of about 40 acres. 61 Other facilities which
have significant land use impacts include storage and treatment
plants,02 navigation and access channels, crew boat basins and
equipment depots.
Other Environmental Impacts
In addition to their land use impacts, all the above facilities generate air, noise, and water pollution, which reduce aesthetic enjoyment and property values and can be health hazards.
Increased refinery production in particular can mean serious degradation of air quality. A single 200,000 barrels-per-day refinery
can contribute significantly to violation of federal ambient air quality standards in the surrounding area even though emissions from
the refinery do not by themselves violate applicable emission standards. 63 Water quality is also adversely affected by refinery operations.

64

59. In Ventura County, California, a proposed refinery will occupy at
least 1000 acres of valuable farmland. See 2 id. at 271-72.
60. 4 CEQ REPORT ch. II, at 9.
61. OCS development planned off southern California could affect 400 to
600 acres in this manner. 2 SourmmN CAr FoRNmA TRACT SPECIeC EIS 219.
62. An estimated seven to 15 of these plants would be necessary in southem California. Id. at 237.
63. Refineries emit five major pollutants: oxides of sulfur, nitrogen,
carbon, particulate matter, and hydrocarbons. Sulfur dioxide is emitted
from refineries processing oil containing sulfur. Nitrogen oxides are components of the gases which are released during the furnace and power plant
boiler stages. The catalytic cracker is a significant potential source of particulate matter and carbon monoxide. Hydrocarbons leak throughout the
refinery and storage areas and especially around pumps, valve glands and
flange areas. Technology exists to remove the sulfur, and if the refinery
installed the best control devices and followed good maintenance procedures, particulate matter and carbon monoxide emissions could be contained

within federal standards. But even if these procedures were followed, hy-

drocarbon emissions would be in excess of federal standards by a factor
of 20 to 40. Hydrocarbon emissions themselves are not known to be a
health hazard, but photochemical smog formed from hydrocarbons is a significant health hazard. See Radian Corporation, Some Environmental Considerationsin the PetroleumRefining Industry 7-24, in 2 CEQ REPoRT.
64. Although sewage treatment plant discharges are the primary source

[VOL. 13: 253, 1976]

Where Energy Meets the Environment
SAI

DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Economic Impacts
High oil industry wages and the burst of investment accompany-

ing OCS development bring benefits to many, but the inflationary
side effects make economic survival for those outside the oil industry more difficult. The development phase can lead to a severe
65
Private housing conhousing shortage in smaller communities.

struction may lag because contractors are at work on OCS-related
projects.
The economic impacts on state and local government are equally
significant. Public services are required immediately for large
groups of people who are likely to have jobs in the area for only
a relatively short period. Thus public expenditures increase significantly faster than revenues during the development phase of OCS
activity. 06 After the initial construction stage, the demand for labor decreases substantially and unemployment rises.
Ultimately the oil and gas deposits are exhausted: unless careful
planning and management of oil and gas activities has occurred,
the abandonment of oil and gas wells may leave boom communities
in debt, with a substantial supply
and their governments severely
67
of unneeded capital facilities.
Through long-range planning, community planners can attempt to
diversify the economy sufficiently so that the classic boom-bust cycle does not materialize. 68 Nevertheless, evidence indicates that

of water pollution in coastal areas, petroleum-related industries also contribute significant amounts of waste. In the Santa Barbara Channel, Santa
Monica Bay, and the northern coast of Orange County, California, direct
ocean discharges from petroleum-related industries contribute about six
percent of the suspended solids, 14 percent of the oil and grease, two percent of the biochemical oxygen demand, and ten percent of the chemical
oxygen demand. They discharge additional amounts of waste into municipal
systems. These wastes are then discharged into the ocean after varying
degrees of treatment. See 1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TRACT SPEcIc EIS 711.
65. The cost of housing in Peterhead on the North Sea in Scotland has
tripled since 1970 when the offshore oil industry arrived. LESSONS FROm
SCOTLAND 62.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id. at 37.
68. See COASTAL MANAGElIENT Or THE OCS 29-37. In Scotland, the planning and land use control mechanisms are highly developed. See LESSONS
FROM SCOTLAND 129-33. Yet the burdens of coping with the immediate problems of North Sea oil development have been too great to allow long-range
planning. See id. at 134-40.

over the long term the economic costs of OCS development to state
and local governments will exceed the revenues they receive.00
Conclusion
Large communities can absorb OCS development more readily
than small ones. The former generally have a more diverse economic base and greater planning resources. Yet in large communities pollution problems are the worst and undeveloped coastal land
is in shortest supply. However, many small communities do
not have sufficient schools, housing, roads, and other facilities
to cope with a rapid increase in jobs and population, nor sufficient
resources and knowledge to create and apply a long-term development plan. In any case, the legal framework in which United
States OCS development is taking place does not encourage planning by local governments with respect to onshore impacts.
LEGAL FRAMEwoRK FOR OCS DEVELOPMENT

The principal components of the 'legal framework in which OCS
development is proceeding are: (1) the Truman Proclamation of
71
194570 and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf;
(2) the Submerged Lands Act 72 and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act,73 both enacted in 1953; (3) the National Environmental
Policy Act;7 4 and (4) the Coastal Zone Management Act 1 5
69. Under present tax and revenue structures the State of Louisiana
claims that it sustains net onshore costs in excess of assignable tax revenues
of $38 million per year in order to provide services in support of operations
on the federal OCS involving 124,400 employees and their families, a total
of 391,000 people. CoumNTE EIS 218, 265. The lost revenues derive from
the inapplicability to the federal OCS of state severance, income, corporate
franchise, sales and use, occupational license, ad valorem and miscellaneous
taxes. Louisiana estimates this loss at $183 million in state taxes and $84
million in parish and municipal taxes. GULF Soum RssEARcH INSTITUTE,
OFFSHORE REVENUE

SHARING:

AN ANALYSIS

OF OFFSHORE OPERATIONS IN

COASTAL STATES 558 (1974).

70. Proclamation No. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 3 C.F.R. § 67 (1943-1948 Comp.).
71. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
in force June 10, 1964, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
72. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
73. Id. §§ 1331-43.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. IV, 1974). The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act [hereinafter cited as FWPCA], 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp.
I1, 1973), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), as amended,
(Supp. I1, 1973), apply to a broad range of OCS development activities
and are discussed later in connection with the Coastal Zone Management
Act. The federal Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp.
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The Truman Proclamationof 1945 and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 claimed the ...

natural re-

sources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United States" as subject to United States
jurisdiction and control.7
Its principal purpose was to facilitate
development of continental shelf petroleum resources. 7 This assertion of sovereignty was codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. The Convention defined the continental
shelf as the seabed and subsoil out to a depth of 200 meters or beyond ". . . to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of
the exploitation of the natural resources."78 Most importantly, the
Convention recognized the rights of coastal nations in the shelf as
I, 1973), is much narrower in scope; in any case, noise is not one of the
more worrisome aspects of OCS development. The federal Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34, 33 U.S.C.
1401-44 (Supp. IV, 1973), known as the "Ocean Dumping Act," applies to
matter dumped in OCS waters from vessels but not from fixed structures
such as offshore oil drilling rigs; furthermore, it does not apply to oil spills
or sewage from either source. The FWPCA covers oil spills from vessels
in OCS waters and all discharges, except oil spills, from fixed structures
such as drilling rigs. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (B) (Supp. I1, 1973). Oil spills
from drilling rigs are governed solely by regulations issued under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. Under those regulations lessees are responsible for clean-up costs, but no liability for damages to third parties is imposed. See ENMVo
wmNTAL LAW INSTrTUTE, FEDEMuL ENVnONirIENTAL LAW
653-55, 738 n.241, 744-46 (1974). The Ocean Dumping Act also provides for
the establishment of development-free marine sanctuaries extending to the
seaward limit of the outer continental shelf. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (Supp.
IV, 1974). The only sanctuary designated to date, the area surrounding the
submerged wreck of the Civil War ship Monitor, was established for historical rather than ecological reasons. See 40 Fed. Reg. 21706 (1975).
A host of state and local laws such as land use controls and building
codes come into play in connection with the onshore manifestations of OCS
development. Generally state air and water pollution programs now operate under the federal Clean Air Act and the FWPCA. Coastal land use controls are being reorganized under the Coastal Zone Management Act. For
a summary of legislation affecting the OCS, see SENATE Comm. ON COMWERCE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., OuTER CONTnqENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOP'EN-T AN T= COASTAL ZONE (Comm. Print 1974).

76. Proclamation No. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 3 C.F.R. §§ 67, 68 (1943-1948
Comp.).
77. Krueger, International and National Regulation of Pollution from
Offshore Oil Production,7 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 541, 542 (1970).
78. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
in force June 10, 1964, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.

being "exclusive [and] sovereign for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources. ' 7 9 Thus the current international
regime governing increased United States petroleum development of
the continental shelf is sympathetic to exploitation. 0 However,
this regime, particularly its open-ended recognition of national
sovereignty, could be significantly changed as a result of the United
Nations Law of the Seas negotiations.8 ' Even with a new regime,
certain rights under the 1958 Convention may be recognized as
82
"vested."
The Submerged Lands Act and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Submerged Lands Act and the OCS Lands Act grew out of
88 in
the landmark 1947 decision in United States v. California,
which the Supreme Court held that the federal government rather
84
than the states owned the seabed adjacent to the states' coastlines.
Congress responded in 1953 with the Submerged Lands Act, conveying to the states the portion of the seabed extending seaward
three geographical miles.8 5 Three months later the OCS Lands Act
79. Id. art. 2, paras. 1, 2.
80. The convention does prohibit unjustifiable interferences with navigation, fishing and conservation of living resources, id. art. 5, para. 1, and the
companion 1958 Convention on the High Seas requires regulations to prevent pollution resulting from seabed exploration activities or from the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines. Convention on the High Seas, done
at Geneva, April 29, 1958, in force Sept. 30, 1962, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
81. The issues raised in these negotiations have been discussed extensively in legal literature. See, for example, recent Law of the Sea symposia in the San Diego Law Review, issue number three of volumes 8-12.
82. See Knight, United States Ocean Policy: Perspective 1974, 49 NoME
DAmE LAw. 241, 249 (1973).
83. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
84. California claimed only the first three miles of adjacent seabed,
United States v. California was then applied to defeat more expansive
claims in United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) and United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970). The act was held constitutional in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 950 (1954). If at
the time a state became a member of the Union, its seaward boundary extended farther than three miles, the extended boundary was recognized and
preserved by the Act. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (b) (1970). Eventually, the Supreme Court held that only Texas and Florida could establish the requisite
historical interest and therefore were entitled to three marine leagues (10 /2
geographic miles) from their coasts; the rest of the states were entitled to
three geographic miles. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960);
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 856 (1960).
The very difficult process of settling the exact boundary between state and
federal ownership continues today. See United States v. Louisiana, 95 S.

[VOL. 13: 253, 1976]

Where Energy Meets the Environment
SAN DIEGO LAW

EVIEW

was passed authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant oil
and gas leases to the highest bidder on the balance retained in federal ownership.8 6 By 1963 over 3.5 million acres off the gulf coasts
87
The Pacific
of Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had been leased.
Coast was opened with the leasing of substantial acreage off Santa
Barbara, California in 1968.88 Several states also enacted similar
legislation and proceeded to lease portions of their ownership for
oil and gas development.8 9
Recent proposals for substantial increases in the federal acreage
leased, including previously unexplored frontier areas on the Atlantic and Alaskan coasts, have stimulated judicial and congressional
reconsideration of the state-federal ownership system and the OCS
Lands Act. Nevertheless, the outlook for change is not promising.
With the exception of Florida, all thirteen states bordering the
Atlantic Ocean attempted to establish state ownership of the entire
continental shelf off their coasts, basing their claim on the fact that
such ownership existed at the time they entered the Union. How90
ever, the Supreme Court in United States v. Maine, decided in
Ct. 1180 (1975); Wulf, Freezing the Boundary Dividing Federal and State
Interests in Offshore Submerged Lands, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 584 (1971).
86. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
87. Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf: The Santa BarbaraDisaster, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 514,
522 (1972), citing DEPARTmENT OF TH INTEPIOR, PLAIN FACTS ABouT Om 21
(1963).
88. The notorious 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill occurred at a well on this
leased federal acreage. The seabed off Louisiana has been the most productive with over 95 percent of OCS production to date. 1 CEQ REPORT
176.
89. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6870-79 (West Supp. 1975). Actually, California granted the first state offshore oil lease in 1921, prior to
the decision in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). For a detailed history of the exploration of submerged lands off the coasts of California, Texas and Louisiana, see E. BARTLEY, Tus TDELANDS OIL CONTROvERsy, A LEGAL AND MSToRicAL ANALYSIS (1953). See also Metcalfe, The
Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal
Problem, 4 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 39 (1952).
90. 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975). Ownership claims of Alaska and Florida also
were recently rejected. United States v. Alaska, 95 S. Ct. 2240 (1975);
United States v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 1162 (1975). Although the states have
generally proceeded more slowly to develop the submerged lands under
their jurisdiction, and although drainage problems sometimes occur between
adjacent state and federal tracts along the three-mile line, the states did
not pursue these claims for competitive reasons or pure greed. What the
states fear the most and hoped to avoid by establishing ownership are the

March 1975, rejected these claims. The Court returned to United
States v. California9 ' for the principle that whatever interest the
states might have had prior to statehood was relinquished to the
federal government upon entry into the union; present state ownership is derived solely from and subject to the conditions and limitations of the Submerged Lands Act.9 2

With federal ownership of

the Atlantic OCS thus clearly established, the Department of the
Interior is proceeding with its program for oil and gas development
of the Atlantic frontier under the OCS Lands Act.0 3
However, the OCS Lands Act is not without its critics. The principal complaint is that Congress has authorized development of
valuable public resources located in a fragile environment without
sufficiently regulating either the receipt and distribution of the revenues received for the resources or the impacts flowing from their
development. 94 The two are not unrelated, for proper revenue distribution may go a long way toward healing the wounds caused by
development of the resources. Thus there have been numerous proposals to distribute various portions of OCS oil and gas revenues
to impacted coastal state and local governments. 5 However, passage of such a measure remains problematic, given current federal
fiscal circumstances and executive office views thereon. In any
case, the more such adverse impacts are avoided or mitigated in the
development process, the less money is required to compensate for
then
Unfortunately, the OCS Lands Act says nothing about avoidance
or mitigation, nor does it provide for planning in regard to the impacts that do occur. Authority over safety and navigation on OCS
onshore impacts of accelerated federal development.

See 5 BNA ENvm.

REP.CURRENT DEVELOPMVENTS 1408-09 (1975).

91. 332U.S. 19 (1947).
92. 95 S. Ct. at 1159-61.

93. See 1 DEPATmENT OF = INTERIOR, DRAPT EmrmNmENTAL STATEMENT: PROPOSED INCREASE IN ACREAGE TO BE OFFERED FOR OIL AND GAs LEAsING O N THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 173-266, 558-704 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as PROGRAmMATIC EIS].

94. See text accompanying notes 37-69 supra.
95. E.g., S. 521, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 1 CEQ

REPORT 209; GuLF
SouTH RESEARCH INsTITUTE, OrFSHoRE REVENUE SHARING: AN ANALYSIS OF
OFFSHORE OPERATION ON COASTAL STATES (1974); LESSONS FROM SCOTLmAND

173-74. The OCS Lands Act presently provides that OCS revenues are to
be deposited in the Treasury of the United States and that state taxation
laws do not apply to the OCS, and the Act generally denies the states any
other interest in the resources and revenues of the OCS. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333
(a) (2), (3) (1970); 43 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970). However, revenues from other
public lands are generally shared with state and local governments. See
ENVmONMmTAL

LAw

ISTrTUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

533-34 (1974).
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96
and the Army,97 and the
waters is granted to the Coast Guard
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to adopt regulations for conserving OCS resources 98 and preventing waste. But the Act

focuses on granting leases ".

.

. in order to meet the urgent need for

further exploration and development of the oil and gas deposits
"99

The record of the Department of the Interior in administering
OCS oil and gas leases is at best spotty. The failures of the system
in regard to the monumental 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and the
1969 and 1970 blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico have been documented elsewhere. 0 0° In response to these disasters, there has been
much discussion of changes in lease administration and enforcement, 10 1 but current Department of the Interior proposals for increased leasing are premised on continuation of the present system.102
Even the choice of leasing as the method by which rights in the

OCS are transferred needs rethinking, along with the terms upon
96. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (e)(1), (2) (1970) (safety and navigation markers);
see 14 U.S.C. §§ 81-93 (1970).

97. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1970) (obstructions to navigation); see 33 U.S.C.
§§540-45 (1970).
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1) (1970).
99. Id. § 1337(a) (1970).
100. Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil Spills: An Evaluation of Recent
United States Responses, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1970); Walmsley, Oil
Pollution Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of the Continental Shelf:
The Santa BarbaraDisaster, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 514 (1972). The parties
injured by the 1969 Santa Barbara spill have not had an easy time recovering damages for their losses. Id. at 537-60; see Union Oil v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fishermen may recover for profits lost
due to oil company negligence); Oppen v. Aetna Ins., 485 F.2d 252 (9th
Cir. 1973) (private pleasure boat owners may recover for physical damages
but not loss of use). See also Union Oil v. Minier, 437 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1970) (state prosecution for criminal nuisance enjoined).
101. H.R. 3638, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), would impose strict liability
for oil spills on OCS lessees and owners and operators of vessels used in
connection with OCS activities.
102. 2 PROGRMMATIC EIS 342. Proposed orders governing operations by
lessees in the frontier Gulf of Alaska area have been criticized by the federal Environmental Protection Agency. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTnUT,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10090-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ELR].
See also DEPARTMENT OF TE INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO GEOLOGICAL AND GEoPHYsIcAL ExPLoRATIoNs nV THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 3 (1975), where
the first consideration listed in regulating exploration activities is to avoid
interfering with present lease operations.

which the leasing is done. This point is illustrated by recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning actions
taken by the Secretary of the Interior to suspend oil operations off
Santa Barbara after the 1969 spill. In Gulf Oil v. Morton'0 3 and
Union Oil v. Morton,104 the court of appeals held that the Secretary
could only temporarily suspend operations and that an indefinite
suspension not in accordance with regulations in force at the time
the leases were entered would constitute a "taking" of oil company
property rights. 0 5 Thus, under the present system, even after a
disastrous spill, either the lessees must be compensated for the
value of their leases or operations allowed to continue despite extraordinary risks, a most unsatisfactory and unnecessary choice.
Whether rights in the OCS continue to be transferred by leases, it
would seem legally possible, economically feasible, and highly desirable to condition exercise of the rights transferred upon a showing of relative safety by the transferee. After appropriate notice,
the transferee could be required to suspend operations and make
such a showing before resuming an activity believed to be unusually dangerous. If prospective transferees reduce their offers because of such conditions, acceptance is still justified by the needed
flexibility gained.' 0 6 To ensure enforcement of these conditions a
"citizen suit" provision could be provided. This provision, similar
to those in several federal pollution control statutes, 0 7 would allow
103. 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973), vacating 345 F. Supp. 685 (1972).
104. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 750-52. Similar claims are being pursued by Sun Oil Company and Superior Oil Company in the United States Court of Claims, Sun
Oil v. United States. See 6 BNA ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 7-8
(1975). The Programmatic EIS rather meekly accepts the approach of
Union Oil v. Morton. 2 PRon

w\mc

EIS 342.

106. The recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sierra

Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing), 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in further detail later in connection with the National Environmental
Policy Act, makes the inclusion of such conditions even more important.
In upholding the adequacy of an environmental impact statement prepared
by the Department of the Interior for OCS leasing off Mississippi, Alabama
and Florida (MAFLA), the court relied heavily on the alleged "continuously controllable" nature of the project. Id. at 824; see id. at 824-28. However, the principal powers of federal field supervisors under the present system appear to be limited to alternative placement of structures within the
leased tract and deployment of oil spill containment equipment. SOUTHERN CALiFoRNA CoUNcI OF LOCAL GOVERNmENTs, ANALvsis or DRAFT ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED 1975 OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFFsHORE SOUHERm CALIFORuMA 87 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as COUNTER TRACT SPEC=C EIS]. If the costs of improved
safety and environmental protection measures make development unattractive, the answer is not to forego such measures, but rather to defer development until technological advances reduce the costs or until the value
of the resource increases. 1 CEQ REPORT 207.
107. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1415 (g) (Supp. MI, 1973); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857h-2,
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any person to enforce the conditions through notice to the appropriate administrator and suit in federal district court.108
These and other defects in procedures under the OCS Lands Act
are widely acknowledged.109 Proposals to amend the act have been
introduced in Congress," 0 but they are given little chance of passage during the current administration. Given the circumstances,
it is understandable why those concerned about the impacts of accelerated OCS development have turned to the well-known National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)"M as a means of improving the OCS decision-making process. However, these efforts have
been on the whole unsuccessful, 112 for the NEPA impact statement
procedure does not supply either the substantive environmental criteria 13 or the planning mechanisms" 4 missing from the OCS Lands
Act decision-making process. 115 Because further challenges to the
4911 (Supp. I1, 1973). In addition, these provisions authorize the court to
award reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to any party whenever
the court determines such an award is appropriate.
108. Several sources, including a committee of the National Academy of
Sciences, recommend the use of citizen suits in connection with OCS leasing.
See 1 CEQ REPORT 184, 210.
109. See, e.g., commentary cited note 100 supra.
110. E.g., H.R. 2892, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).

112. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing), 510 F.2d
813 (5th Cir. 1975). The threat of litigation under NEPA did motivate the
Department of the Interior to prepare an environmental impact statement
on its total proposed leasing program (the Programmatic EIS), rather
than to rely solely on individual EIS's for each tract to be leased.
See 5 BNA ENVm. REP. CunnmqT DEVmoPmmxrrs 566-67 (1974).

NEPA also

contributed to an environmentally protective interpretation of the regulatory powers of the Secretary of the Interior under the OCS Lands Act in
Gulf Oil v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1973).
113. As a stop-gap measure, S. 827, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and the
companion H.R. 3719, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975), would require disclosure
of "performance standards" applied to OCS lessees in a supplemental NEPA
statement to accompany all EIS's prepared in connection with OCS leasing.
114. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Sierra Club
v. Morton (Great Plains Coal), 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975) suggests that
under NEPA "the duty to plan comprehensively can be imposed on the
Government apart from the duty to file an impact statement ....

."

Id.

at 874. The problem remains that nowhere in NEPA is there any indication
of how this planning is to be carried out.
115. The "Proximity Evaluation" matrices relied upon by the Department
of the Interior to evaluate OCS development risks, see, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing), 510 F.2d 813, 821 n.16 (5th Cir. 1975);
2 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA TRACT SPEC=c EIS 320-348, are inadequate for decision-making purposes because: (1) the risks different tracts pose to im-

OCS program under NEPA are almost certain,1 10 and because subjecting OCS proposals to NEPA review has shed light on defects
in both the NEPA and OCS Lands Act processes, the application
of NEPA to OCS development is discussed in detail.
The National Environmental Policy Act
The principal requirement of NEPA is that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be prepared for all proposed

".

.

major fed-

eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"; the EIS then accompanies the proposal through the
agency review process. 11 7 The statement must discuss in detail the
proposal's environmental impact, including adverse environmental
effects, short-term consumption versus long-term productivity, irreversible effects and irretrievable commitments of resources; it
must also present reasonable alternatives to the proposal together
with their environmental impacts. 1 8 Although NEPA does not
specifically address energy problems, its procedures have been invoked in several significant energy decisions." 9
Evaluation of Energy Alternatives
The leading case on the scope of the alternatives which must be
considered in an EIS is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 20 decided in 1972. This is also the first case in which the
desire to use OCS oil 'and gas as a short-term solution to the "energy
crisis" clashed with the longer range perspectives of NEPA. In an
portant resources are evaluated in regard to only two hazards, oil spills and

disruption from structures, and other factors such as the location of earth-quake fault lines are ignored, id. at 320; and (2) the system is arbitrary
in that it develops relative priorities only among tracts, without any evaluation of whether the risks from all tracts are too great to permit development of any of them. The Department of the Interior acknowledges the
system is "subjective." Id. at 343. In the recent Gulf of Mexico "MAFLA"
lease offering, no tracts were eliminated because of environmental data de-

veloped through the impact statement process. 1 CEQ REPORT 181. Without
extensive research to develop baseline environmental data for areas exposed
to OCS development, these problems can never be solved. See id. at 210.
Estimates of the time required to do such research range from two to five
years. CouNTER TRAcT SPEcIFIc EIS 87, 189.
116. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Department of the Interior, No. 75
C-208 (E.D.N.Y. complaint filed Feb. 10, 1975), 5 ELR 65257 (Digest Facsimile Service No. 332, 1975).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
118. Id. §§ (i)- (v).
119. The most useful NEPA commentaries are F. ANDERSON, NEPA iN
THE ComrsTS (1973) and the chapter on NEPA by the same author in ENvmoNmE TAL LAw INS TrIE, Fnm~AL ENvIOiVImENTALr

120. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

LAW

238-419 (1974).
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EIS covering the proposed leasing of 80 tracts in the Gulf of Mexico,
the Secretary of the Interior refused to consider increasing oil imports as an alternative to OCS development on the ground he lacked
authority to increase imports. 121 The court ordered the Secretary
to consider all reasonable alternatives to the proposed leasing regardless of whether their implementation is in his power. An EIS
is intended to enlighten the public, Congress and other government
officials, as well as the agency preparing the statement. 1 22 In essence the court was telling the Secretary to prepare a definitive
national energy plan encompassing all potential sources of supply
and demand for the foreseeable future. Without such a plan, a particular energy development proposal cannot be placed in context
and its costs and benefits weighed against those of feasible alternatives, including energy conservation measures. 23 To date no such
plan has been prepared.
Environmental Impact Analysis
The EIS at issue in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton is 67 pages long, excluding appendices. 24 For subsequent
25
and discuss alternative
OCS proposals, the EIS's are much longer
26
but other defects remain unremedied. For exenergy sources,
ample, continuing blind faith is placed in regulations qua regulations as a means of preventing pollution from OCS 'drilling, not27
withstanding a fully documented history of weak enforcement.
Onshore land use and economic and social impacts are still given
121. More specifically, he lacked authority to reduce or eliminate
entirely quotas on oil imports. Id. at 834.
122. Id. at 833, 835, 844.
123. See 1 CEQ REPORT 196-200.
124. 458 F.2d 827, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
125. The two volume ProgrammaticEIS is 1250 pages long excluding appendices and the four volume Southern California Tract Specific EIS contains 2000 pages including appendices. Lengthy "counter EIS's" also have
been spawned. The Programmatic Counter EIS is 527 pages long and the
CounterTract Specific EIS is 202 pages.
126. The EIS covering the leasing of 147 additional tracts in the Gulf of
Mexico unsuccessfully attacked in Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS
Leasing), 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975), devoted 352 pages to alternatives
alone. Id. at 825 n.32.
127. See id. at 821-23, 825-28; National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The EIS challenged in Sierra
Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing) disclosed numerous violations of
regulations by lessees. See 1 CEQ REPORT 183. When an agency promises
in an EIS to change a regulatory system, problems are presented of evaluat-

29
short shrift,128 despite continuing criticism.1
However, it is unlikely these defects will cause the courts to hold
that the EIS's do not adequately fulfill NEPA's requirements. Although it contains such defects, an EIS for increased OCS leasing
in the Gulf of Mexico was recently held adequate by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing).10° The
court's reasoning is unsatisfactory. Pollution hazards were said to be
"continuously controllable"' 13 ' through lease stipulations and regulations despite the very poor enforcement record. 82 As to onshore impacts, it was sufficient that the states ". . . have been
consulted on several occasions and encouraged to begin planning
environmental safeguards for the construction and operation of onshore pipelines and facilities."'1 83 Under this narrow interpretation,
no hope exists for those who seek to utilize NEPA's processes in
planning onshore impacts. 3 4 The states will have to rely solely on
the coastal planning mechanisms of the Coastal Zone Management
35
Act.1
For future litigants who dispute the Fifth Circuit's narrow approach, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Aberdeen &
Rockfish Railroad v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP II)13 6 is of little comfort. In its first decision on
the merits under NEPA, 37 the Court held adequate an EIS prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission for proposed freight
rate increases. The three-judge district court had described the EIS
as "combative, defensive"'138 and otherwise "sorely .deficient."'13 9

ing now the effectiveness of future changes and, if changes are in fact made,
of monitoring and reporting their effectiveness to the original decisionmaker, interested agencies and the public. In addition there is the question
of whether such promises are legally enforceable.
128. See Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA OCS Leasing), 510 F.2d 813,
824 (5th Cir. 1975); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Programmatic EIS devotes 20 of its
1250 pages to onshore land use and socioeconomic effects. 2 PROGRAMMATIC
EIS 219-39. The 2000 page Southern California Tract Specific EIS covers
the same subject in 35 pages. 2 SourHERN CALiFoRNm TRACT SPECIFIC EIS
264-99.
129. See 4 BNA ENVm. REP. CURRMENT DEVELOPMENTS 1855 (1974); CouxTER EIS 208-19; CouNTER TRACT SPEcmc EIS 62-65.
130. 510F.2d 813 (Sth Cir. 1975).
131. Id. at 824.
132. See id. at 822-23, 825-28.
133. Id. at 824.
134. See 1 CEQ REPORT 180; LESSONS FROm SCOTLAND 164-65.
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. IV, 1974).
136. 95 S. Ct. 2336 (1975).
137. The Court took a sympathetic approach toward standing to sue to
enforce NEPA in United States v. SCRAP (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
138. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (1974).
139. Id. at 1299. Specific defects included failing to study the environ-
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The procedural complexities of ICC rate-making proceedings did

play a significant role in the Court's decision;1 40 even so, the opinion

is not sympathetic to NEPA. 141
Standard of Judicial Review
Another important hurdle for litigants challenging the adequacy
of OCS EIS's is the standard of judicial review applied. The Supreme Court did not reach the question in SCRAP 11,142 but most

circuit courts agree that the appropriate test for adequacy of an EIS
is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 43 In addition, although there is less agreement on
the point, the Fifth Circuit held in Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA

OCS Leasing) that at trial the plaintiffs must demonstrate inadequacy by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by a mere
prima facie showing of deficiencies; before the court of appeals,
they must show that the district court was clearly erroneous.'4
Thus the burdens on litigants challenging the adequacy of OCS
EIS's are substantial.
Programmatic Statements
On other issues NEPA has been interpreted -moresympathetically
mental impact of the underlying rate structure to which the proposed increases would be added, failing to react to the critical comments of other
federal agencies and environmental groups, and generally attempting to
justify in the statement a decision already made. Id. at 1301-04.

140. See 95 S. Ct. at 2352-53, 2357-58.
141. See id. at 2355-59. Justice Douglas in dissent said the EIS had been

"thoroughly discredited by the comments of other federal agencies" and

therefore should be held inadequate. Id. at 2360. Perhaps the strongest
statement the majority made in favor of NEPA enforcement was the following:

NEPA does create a discreet procedural obligation on government

agencies to give written consideration of environmental issues in
connection with certain major federal actions and a right of action
in adversely affected parties to enforce that obligation. When
agency or departmental consideration of environmental factors in
connection with that "federal action" is complete, notions of finality and exhaustion do not stand in the way of judicial review of
the adequacy of such consideration ....

Id. at 2355.

142. Id. at 2359 n.28.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970); see Sierra Club v. Morton (MAFLA
OCS Leasing), 510 F.2d 813, 829 n.49 (5th Cir. 1975). Still unresolved is
the question of the extent to which agency approval of a project remains

reviewable once an adequate EIS is prepared. See SCRAP II, 95 S. Ct. 2336,
2354-55 n.18 (1975); Note, The Latest Adverse Alternative Approach to
Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARv. L. REv. 735 nn.2, 3 (1975).

144. 510 F.2d at 818.

in the energy context. Under NEPA, there is a general problem
of deciding when an idea for a federal program significantly affecting the environment has progressed sufficiently to become a "proposal for major federal action" so that an EIS must be prepared.
The leading case on this point arose in connection with the Atomic
Energy Commission's1 4 5 research and development program for the
liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commission,'4" the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that because the program had moved
beyond pure scientific research toward creation of a viable power
industry based on the breeder reactor, the time was appropriate for
preparation of an EIS evaluating the program. 47 The Scientists'
Institute for Public Information case and the Council on Environmental Quality guideline upon which it relied 48 have become the
foundation for a new generation of EIS's which cover entire programs. Prior practice had been to prepare statements for individual construction projects within a program. Programmatic EIS's
do not replace these; instead, they provide a framework for the individual project EIS's.
The lack of a programmatic EIS for OCS development was a major problem in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton. 49 Since this decision, draft and final programmatic EIS's for
OCS development have been prepared 10 and circulated for comment, and public 'hearings have been held on the draft EIS, all pursuant to the statute and to Council on Environmental Quality
guidelines. 151 Both the draft and final OCS programmatic EIS's
145. The AEC has since been split into ERDA, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
See ENVION mNTAL LAW INsTrUTE, FEDERtAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 983-84 (1974).
146. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
147. Related factors in the court's decision to order preparation of an EIS
were the sheer magnitude of the federal investment in the program which
would restrict future alternatives, and the controversial nature of the program. Id. at 1082. The AEC had committed an average of $100 million
a year toward the goal of commercial viability by 1980 and had expected
breeder reactors to constitute 25 percent of all electrical generating capacity
in the United States by the year 2000. Id. at 328.
148. See 481 F.2d at 1090. The current guideline i found at 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.6 (d) (1) (1975).
149. See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
150. See PROGRAmMATIC EIS and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FNAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, PROPOSED INCREASE IN OIL AND GAS LEASING ON
THE OuTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
GRAmmATIC

EIS].

(1975)

[hereinafter cited as FINAL Pno-

151. The Council on Environmental Quality guidelines to federal agencies
for the implementation of NEPA do not have the force of law, but they
are accorded great weight by the courts. See Sierra Club v. Morton (Great
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share the previously noted defects-unwarranted reliance on regulations and lease stipulations to prevent pollution 5 2 and failure to
analyze the onshore impacts of OCS development. 153 Even. the
evaluation of alternatives to OCS development, the principal purpose to be served by a programmatic EIS, has been criticized as inadequate. 54 However, because the standards which an adequate
programmatic EIS must meet have not been formulated with any
specificity, a successful court challenge to the final OCS program-

matic EIS seems unlikely.

55

Regional Impact Statements
In addition to programmatic and tract specific EIS's for OCS development, several commentators 56 have recommended that intermediate regional EIS's be prepared, each covering, for example, a
portion of the Atlantic coast where leasing is expected to take place
in several stages. These regional EIS's would be especially useful
for comprehensive planning of the region-wide, cumulative onshore
impacts. 57 So far, the Department of the Interior has not adopted
the suggestion in connection with its current proposals &orOCS de58
velopment.
The recent decision in Sierra Club v.

Morton (Great Plains

Plains Coal), 514 F.2d 856, 871 n.22, 873-74 n.24. (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
Department of the Interior's implementation of the guidelines in connection
with OCS development has not been free from criticism. Despite the fact
that such action is not expressly prohibited, the Department probably violated the spirit of the guidelines by circulating the draft Southern California
Tract Specific EIS prior to the Final Programmatic EIS. See CoErail
TRACT SPECnc EIS 20-22. Such actions lend credibility to allegations that
the OCS EIS's are being prepared merely to justify decisions already made.
See generally Sierra Club v. Morton (Great Plains Coal), 514 F.2d 856, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
152. See note 127 supra.
153. See note 128 supra.
154. CoumNr EIS 38-129.
155. See EimroNvxNTAL LAw INsTnur , FEDERAL ENvnmo3
ENAL LAw
338 (1974).
156. These commentators include the Council on Environmental Quality
and a committee of the National Academy of Sciences. 1 CEQ REPORT 180,
193, 210; see LEssoxs PROm SCOTLAND 171-72.
157. See 1 CEQ REPORT 180; cf. Sierra Club v. Morton (Great Plains
Coal), 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
158. The draft Southern California Tract Specific EIS makes an inadequate attempt to assess the impacts of OCS development on the southern
California region. See 2 SouTmEmw CALIFoRNTA TRACT SPEC=c EIS 264-99.

Coal) 159 provides only a tenuous basis for compelling the preparation of regional EIS's. In a lengthy opinion, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the question of whether the time
was ripe for preparation of a regional EIS covering the activities
of several federal agencies (principally the Department of the Interior) 169 concerned with coal development in the Northern Great
Plains region.1 61 A national coal programmatic EIS and EIS's for
individual coal projects within the Northern Great Plains region
had previously been prepared. Two preliminary regional studies
initiated by the Department of the Interior had been abandoned;
but a third, intended to assess the social, economic, and environmental impacts of Northern Great Plains coal development and obviously useful in preparing a regional EIS, was underway. 1 2 The
question was whether, in addition to the national and individual
project EIS's, NEPA requiredpreparation of a regional EIS.
Although the court remanded the question to the agencies,1 08 its
broad interpretations of NEPA should be noted:
Whether a comprehensive [regional] impact statement is required
cannot turn simply on whether the agency has denominated a
comprehensive series of actions a "program." . . . [NEPA] plainly

contemplates imposing a requirement of comprehensive planning
on the Government when it refuses to do so itself. ... Agency
violation of this substantive duty by a failure to improve its plans
or coordinate its actions might justify a judicial directive to coordinate various major federal actions into one comprehensive
major federal action, followed by a directive ordering issuance of
a comprehensive impact statement for the newly-comprised action.
.. Surely we are not willing to hold that the less comprehensive

planning an agency chooses to do, the less NEPA requires it to do.
... [W]hen the federal government, through exercise of its

159. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
160. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy
Commission, only one agency (the AEC) was involved, and this agency admitted that it was carrying out a "program"-the only question was the
proper scope and timing of EIS's in regard to that program. In Great Plains
Coal, the several agencies involved denied they were together carrying out
a "program." This problem is not present in connection with OCS development, for the Department of the Interior is clearly in charge of a nationwide program and has prepared a nationwide programmatic EIS as well
as tract specific EIS's. for tracts within a region offered for leasing at the
same time. The question remains whether more comprehensive regional
EIS's are also required.
16L This region is defined as northeastern Wyoming, eastern Montana,
western North and South Dakota, with strips extending southerly into Nebraska and Colorado. 514 F.2d at 861. One of the problems in preparing
regional EIS's is defining the appropriate region to be analyzed. The Department of the Interior seems to have broad discretion in defining the geographic boundaries of any regional OCS EIS's that are prepared. See id.
at 881 n.33.
162. Id. at 863, 875-76, 892; see id. at 872.
163. See id. at 879-83.
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power to approve leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water
option contracts, attempts to "control development" of a definite
region, it is engaged in a regional program constituting major
it labels its
federal action within the meaning of NEPA, whether
attempts a "plan," a "program," or nothing at all.164
Unfortunately, the emphasis of the court and others on the NEPA
process as a tool for regional planning is misplaced. The focus of
impact analysis is incremental effects whereas planning is specifically intended to be nonincremental, i.e., comprehensive. However, the Council on Environmental Quality envisions expansion of
the NEPA process into a regional planning device for OCS onshore
development by allowing state and local governments to participate
with the Department of the Interior in the preparation of regional
EIS's. Conflicts would be reconciled through the NEPA circulation
and comment process. 165
Although some benefits would certainly be derived from EIS's
prepared in this manner, the goal of comprehensive regional planning probably could not be achieved. Someone, presumably the
Secretary of the Interior, would have to determine the boundaries
of the region covered in the EIS. After the region is defined, the
major problem remains of getting state and local officials and the
Department of the Interior representatives to work together on the
EIS.16 Because regional development planning is outside the Department of the Interior's usual functions, the value of its contribution would be suspect. Outside expertise could be brought in, but
the Department of the Interior must remain in the process to some
extent because it controls the resource whose exploitation will cause
the planned development. In addition, the parties would be well
advised to resolve as many conflicts as possible in the draft EIS;
because the circulation and comment process has not functioned
well for traditional statements, 167 it could not be counted upon to
play the vital role of conflict resolution for regional EIS's.
Ironically, if despite all difficulties, a cooperative body with regional planning capability is assembled and kept together, the prod164. Id. at 873-75, 878 (emphasis in original).
165. 1 CEQ REPORT 177, 180; see LESSONS TROm ScoTLAND 171-72.
166. With the problem of accelerated OCS development, see text accompanying note 9 supra, state and local governments have so far been Interior's adversaries, both in and out of the courtroom.
167. See ENvIRON MEnAL LAw INsTiTUTE, FEDERAL EnviRoNmENTAL

253-55, 270-73, 389-96 (1974).

LAW

uct produced will probably be an EIS in name only. Fulfilling a
regional planning function requires a comprehensive regional planning document whose focus is not the five aspects of incremental
environmental impact mandated by NEPA. 168 Additionally, a regional plan produced under NEPA may duplicate or, what is more
likely, conflict with a state coastal zone plan prepared under the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).169 That being the
case, it would seem much more efficient to channel OCS onshore
planning through the CZMA mechanism from the beginning, rather
than to try creating a new regional planning process under NEPA
which then must be meshed with state coastal zone programs.
Regardless of the difficulties surrounding preparation of useful
OCS regional EIS's, one must still ask whether the Great Plains
Coal case mandates their preparation. Potentially significant factual differences exist between the OCS and Great Plains Coal situations. The court found that "regional development of the Northern Great Plains is contemplated" by the agencies involved. 170 As
to the OCS, the Department of the Interior might successfully argue that the development it "contemplates" is limited to the OCS
itself and that this development is not on a regional basis. Of
course the Department of the Interior would not deny that onshore
development, primarily facilities for processing and transporting
OCS oil and gas, is a foreseeable consequence of the OCS development it contemplates; but the department has no authority to regulate onshore development. 171 The only means available to it are
indirect, such as regulation of the timing and quantity of OCS development permitted offshore. However, in the Northern Great
Plains, federal agencies have direct permit and licensing power over
both the energy resource and the industry necessary to process and
transport it.17 2 Therefore, they have more control over development of the region, and it is more reasonable to ask them to prepare
a comprehensive regional EIS to aid in planning that development,
in addition to national programmatic and individual project EIS's.
Furthermore, the court in Great Plains Coal was not unmindful
1 73
of the difficulties inherent in its decision, both on a practical'
168. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
169. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. IV, 1973).
170. 514 F.2d at 875.
171. See text accompanying notes 187-98 infra.
172. See 514 F.2d at 865-66.
173. The court said the agencies should decide whether a joint regional
EIS or several single-agency regional EIS's should be prepared, whether
a regional EIS should be subdivided into subregional EIS's, and whether
a regional EIS should be incorporated into individual project EIS's: "All
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and a "spiritual" level, 174 and seemed particularly unwilling to de-

cide the threshold question of whether a Northern Great Plains regional EIS should be prepared. 175 Apparently federal agencies
have greater discretion in deciding whether to prepare regional

17 6
EIS's than they do in resolving other NEPA threshold questions.

However, this approach is justified only when the agency has analyzed the alternatives to its program in the programmatic EIS and
has the data and competence to discover and avoid or mitigate unreasonable environmental risks posed by individual projects within
the program. In such cases, EIS's evaluating the cumulative sec-

ondary impacts of the program on particular regions are still useful
although they are performing finctions more efficiently delegated
to formal regional planning processes.
Unfortunately, the foregoing analysis does not apply to OCS development. Alternatives to OCS development could not be meaningfully analyzed in the OCS programmatic EIS because no national
energy plan exists. The evaluation of environmental risks in the
tract specific EIS's is inadequate because insufficient environmental
baseline data are available on the OCS.177 The ability of the
present OCS regulatory system to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts is doubtful. Finally, the United States has no viable
interstate regional planning mechanism to prefer over regional
that matters is that a comprehensive study of the region is made."

Id. at

882 n.36.
174. "Certainly federal officers are entitled to dream out loud without
filing an impact statement." Id. at 879.
175. See id. at 882 n.40. It also declined to enjoin the agencies from taking any action in regard to coal development in the Northern Great Plains
pending their decision on whether and how to prepare a regional EIS. Id.
at 883.
176. The standard of judicial review of the threshold agency decision not
to prepare a regional EIS is said to be the familiar "arbitrary and capricious" test. Id. at 875. Courts have applied varying degrees of scrutiny
to different agency actions under NEPA, although all are stated to be subject to the arbitrary and capricious test. As to threshold questions of
whether to prepare EIS's for national programs and individual projects, see
FEDERAL ENvrmoN=MAL LAW 328-30,
ENvmoirENTAL LAW IwsTITEU,
356-62 (1974).
177. See note 115 supra. Whether NEPA requires agencies to research

gaps in the knowledge necessary to evaluate project impacts is unclear; at
least some district courts think so. See Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 287-89 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Brooks v. Volpe,
350 F. Supp. 269, 279-80 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C. 1971).

EIS's.17 s The coastal planning supported by the Coastal Zone
Management Act is statewide only, and most coastal states have not
completed the programs called for by the Act.179 However, for reasons suggested above' 80 and discussed more fully below, to the extent successful planning of the onshore impacts of OCS development occurs, it will more likely be under the CZMA than NEPA.
CoastalZone Management Act
Introduction
The Coastal Zone Management Act was passed in 1972 for the
stated purpose of encouraging coastal states to exercise full authority over the lands and waters of their coastal zones. 181 The 30
coastal states (including those bordering the Great Lakes) are encouraged to participate by a two-step funding program administered by the Secretary of Commerce, who has delegated his authority under the Act to the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (the Administrator). 8 2 The Administrator may grant funds to aid -development of a state coastal zone
management program 83 and then, after reviewing and approving
the program, may award additional funds to assist the state in op178. For special situations, interstate compacts to regulate development
are possible. However, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency created in
1969 by compact between California and Nevada has had some serious operational problems. See Comment, Regional Government for Lake Tahoe,
22 HAsTiNGs L.J. 705 (1971). The Coastal Zone Management Act is designed to mesh with more comprehensive national land use legislation. See
16 U.S.C. § 1456 (g) (Supp. IV, 1974). So far Congress has failed to enact
such legislation, leaving the CZMA as the most comprehensive federal land
use legislation to date.
179. See DEPARTM
or COMMERCE, STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
AcTnrzms 1974 (1974). Regional and interstate coordination and cooperation are authorized and encouraged by the act, but no mechanisms for such
activities are provided. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452(d), 1454(g), 1455(c) (2)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
180. See text accompanying notes 166-69 supra.
181. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (Supp. IV, 1974); see Hollings, Congress and
Coastal Zone Management, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 115 (1973).
Two sanctuaries, Coos Bay, Oregon, and Sapelo Island, Georgia, have been
designated under the estuarine sanctuary provision of the Act. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (Supp. IV, 1974). Several other locations are under consideration.
Funding of estuarine sanctuaries is based on equal federal and state contributions.
182. Congress expected that such a delegation would occur because of
the technical expertise in coastal zone matters of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. H.R. Coivr. REP. No. 92-1544, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972), in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & A . Nnws 4822 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as CoNFEENcE REPORT].

183. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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erating the program.13 4 An approved program must control development and resolve conflicts among competing uses in the coastal
zone and permit acquisition and condemnation of property for those
purposes. 8 5 The state may either directly control land and water
uses in the coastal zone or simply review local program implemen186
tation.
Approved state CZMA programs do not automatically displace
the multitude of other federal, state and local regulations applicable
to energy development in the coastal zone. For OCS development,
federal and state regulations apply to pipelines'8 7 and other offshore facilities within three miles of the coast. Federal, state and
local controls apply to onshore facilities necessary to process and
transport OCS oil and gas. The CZMA states that the limits on
air and water pollution established under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)18 8 and the Clean Air Act 8 9 shall be the
pollution limits in state coastal zone programs. 90 The result is not
to restrict CZMA programs to land use control as some observers
have feared, 19 ' for both the FWPCA and the Clean Air Act allow
state and local governments to impose air and water pollution
standards stricter than those promulgated by the federal Environmental Protection Agency. 92 Thus, for example, state and local responses to the hazard of sulfuric acid mist formation in moist
coastal air are permitted.193 Under the Clean Air Act, implementa184. Id. § 1455. Funding of both steps is on a two-thirds federal, onethird state basis.
185. Id. § 1455(d).
186. Id. 9 1455(e).
187. See ENVRONmENTAL
973-74, 1002 (1974).

LAW INsTrzTE FEDERAL EvNm

ENTAL LAW

188. 33 U.S.C. §9 1251-376 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. MI,1973).
190. 16 U.S.C. 9 1456(f) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 40 Fed. Reg. 1691, 1693

(1975).
191. Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 119, 132-34 (1973). But cf. Mandelker & Rothschild, The Role of Land-Use Controls in Combating Air Pollution Under
the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235, 270-71 (1973).

192. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. I1, 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).

193. The discussion at 118 CONG. REc. 14183 (1972) supports the proposi-

tion that the authorizations for stricter state and local air and water pollu-

tion standards are not restricted by the CZMA. Special coastal air pollution

regulations could be included in an approved CZMA program so long as
the CZMA coordination requirements are met.

tion of the nondegradation requirement

94

could limit significantly

coastal siting of new air pollution sources such as refineries. New
refineries sited in the coastal zone will be subject to Clean Air Act
new source performance standards' 96 and FWPCA effluent guidelines and standards.' 9 6 They will also be subject to state environmental impact assessment procedures 97 and state and local land use
controls. 198 The CZMA program development process presents an
opportunity to coordinate all of these requirements to the maximum extent possible.
Siting of Energy Facilities in the Coastal Zone
As to the substantive content of a program, the Coastal Zone
Management Act mandates only four things: (1) control of land
and water uses within the coastal zone which have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters; 19 9 (2) procedures for preserving
200
or restoring areas of recreational, ecological, or aesthetic value;
(3) "... a method of assuring that local land and water use regulations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude
land and water uses of regional benefit"; 201 and (4) ". . . adequate
consideration of the national interest involved in siting of facilities
necessary to meet requirements which are other than local in
20 2
nature.,

Although paragraph (3), the uses of regional benefit provision,
would seem to cover energy-related uses, 20 3 the legislative history
and regulations implementing the Act focus on paragraph (4), the
194. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) (4-4 vote); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw INsTrruTE, FEDERA) ENVI ONMENTAL LAW 1077-82 (1974).
195. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTiTUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

1104-06 (1974).
196. See id. at 695-96. The validity of these standards will almost certainly be litigated by the petroleum industry. See American Petroleum Institute v. Train, 5 ELR 20298 (D. Colo. April 8, 1975). Delaying OCS development until state CZMA programs are approved would also allow time
for finalizing these standards.
197. See, e.g., the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. Pus. REs.
CODE §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1975).
198. No coastal state has enacted a "one-stop" industrial siting law, although a few have adopted such a procedure for electric generating plants.
See, e.g., Washington Thermal Power Plant Siting Law, WAsH. Rsv. CODE
ANN. §§ 80.50.010-.900 (1974). The CZMTA does not require states to enact
such laws as part of their coastal zone programs.
199. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454(b) (2), (4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
200. Id. § 1455(c) (9).
201. Id. § 1455(e)1(2).
202. Id. § 1455(c) (8). Paragraphs (3) and (4) are quoted directly from
the Act because of their relevance to the subject at hand-the impact of
energy development on the coastal zone.
203. The regulations define a use of regional benefit as "a land or water
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facilities siting requirement, which originated in the House version
of the Act. 20 4 According to the House report, if a state coastal zone
program fails to recognize the national interest in the siting of
power plants, transportation facilities and other public services, the
Administrator may not approve the program for the second stage
of funding.20 5 Nevertheless, "the primary responsibility for developing the state program remains in the state," rather than in fed-

eral agencies.

20 6

The regulations governing program approval repeat the same two
themes. A program should evaluate the siting needs of regional energy facilities, including oil and gas wells, storage tanks and pipe20 7
Such facililines, refineries, power plants and deepwater ports.
ties cannot be "arbitrarily excluded" or "unreasonably restricted"
without "good and sufficient reasons. ' 20 8 However, these requirements ". . . should not be construed as compelling the States to propose a program which accommodates certain types of facilities
....
1)209 Neither do the regulations (nor does the Act) require a
state to adopt a special facilities siting procedure; existing land use

controls may be utilized so long as the above requirements are met.
use that typically provides benefits to a significant area beyond the boundaries of a single unit of the lowest level of local, general-purpose government," and link this requirement to the "facilities siting" requirement. 40
Fed. Reg. 1684, 1689 (1975). Blanket exclusions or restrictions on uses of
regional benefit in the coastal zone are not permitted unless they are based
upon "reasonable considerations of the suitability of the area for the uses
or the carrying capacity of the area"; uses of regional benefit may be prohibited in specific areas so long as the prohibition is not "capricious." 40
Fed. Reg. 1689 (1975).
204. H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Most of the act's other provisions originated in the Senate. See S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
CoNrmumcE REPORT 4824.
205. H.R. REP. No. 92-1049, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as HousE REPORT]. The provision was apparently inserted at the request of the electric utility industry which was concerned about exclusion
of power plants and related facilities. Mandelker & Sherry, The National
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 7 URBAw L. ANx. 119, 135 (1974).
Robert Knecht, Director of the Office of Coastal Zone Management, the federal office in charge of administration of the CZMA, has stated that the
facilities siting requirement includes "power plants and the like." Knecht,
Coastal Zone Management-A Federal Perspective, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 123, 127 (1973).
206. HOUSE REPORT 18.

207. 40 Fed. Reg. 1687-88 (1975).
are to be minimized. Id. at 1687.
208. Id.at 1688.
209. Id.

The adverse impacts of these facilities

Obviously, a state that desires to minimize the energy facilities
located in its coastal zone, while developing a program eligible for
further funding, faces a difficult task. 210 The Act's coordination
and mediation provisions must be used extensively.211 The state
must allow parties interested in the energy aspects of its coastal
zone program, including federal agencies, regional organizations,
port authorities, utilities and oil companies, to participate fully in
the program's development.2 12 Coordination with federal agencies
is especially important because the Administrator cannot approve
a program until the views of affected federal agencies have been
210. As of the date of writing, no state program has been finally approved under the act. The Delaware Coastal Zone Act, upon which Delaware's program presumably would be based, bans new heavy industry, including refineries, within two miles of the coast. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, ch.
70, § 7003 (1974); see Kreshtool v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 310
A.2d 649 (Del. 1973); Comment, Land-Use Management in Delaware's
CoastalZone, 6 U. MIcH. J. LAw REFORM 251 (1972); 118 CONG. REc. 1417375 (1972); Note, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 481 (1972). The coastal zone plan
being developed for the California legislature's consideration would permit
construction of a refinery in the coastal zone only if there is no less environmentally damaging site available elsewhere in the state. CALiron~A
COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMISSIONS, PRELIM

Y COASTAL PLAN 227

(Hearing Draft, March 1975); see Douglas, Coastal Zone Management-A

New Approach in California, 1 COASTAL ZONE

MANAGEMENT

J. 1 (1973);

Healy, Saving California'sCoast: The Coastal Zone Initiative and Its Aftermath, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 365 (1974). In Maine, the Governor's Task Force on Energy, Heavy Industry and the Maine Coast has
recommended that new heavy industry be located in two designated zones
with the remainder of the coast held free from new heavy industry. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERcE, STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AcTIVTIES

1974 at 42 (1974); see MacDonald, Shoreland Zoning in Maine, 1 COASTAL
ZoNE MANAGEmENT J. 109 (1973). The Washington Shoreline Management
Act of 1971, upon which Washington's CZMA program is based, prohibits
surface drilling for oil and gas in Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de
Fuca and on land within 1,000 feet of those waters. WAsH. REv. CoDn AN.
§ 90.58.160 (1974); see Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act,
54 ORE. L. REV. 35, 58 (1975). See generally Zwicky & Clark, Environmental Protection Motivation in Coastal Zone Land-Use Legislation, 1
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 103 (1973). The preference of state coastal
zone programs for inland refinery locations and the transportability of
crude oil to those locations suggest the need for national land use planning
legislation analogous to the CZMA. See 1 CEQ REPORT 205; LESSONS FROM
ScoTLAm

127.

211. Strategic considerations in utilizing these provisions are outlined in
Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Management and Intergovernmental
Coordination,54 ORE. L. REV. 13, 30-32 (1975). Key questions are who
among the states, interested federal agencies and the Office of Coastal Zone
Management has the burden of initiating coordination and who has the
greatest bargaining strength. Id. The regulations on coordination with federal agencies appear to place the burden on the state and put federal agencies in a stronger position. See 40 Fed. Reg. 8547 (1975).
212. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974). The regulations urge particular attention to coordination requirements in connection with energy facilities. 40 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1975).
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adequately considered.2 13 When disagreements occur between federal agencies and states, the Administrator mediates them with the
aid of the Executive Office of the President. 21 4 If a state insists,
the Administrator ultimately decides whether a particular provision
1.5

2
requires disapproval of the program.

Consistency of Federal Activities With Approved
State Coastal Zone Programs
Once a state coastal zone program is approved, it not only is eligible for further funding but also is entitled to the benefits of the
Act's federal consistency provisions. 21 6 Federal development projects and other activities "directly affecting the coastal zone" must
be consistent with approved state management programs "to the
maximum extent practicable. 2 17 Federal licenses and permits for
activities "affecting land and water uses in the coastal zone" may
be granted only if the state certifies that the activity complies with
and will be conducted consistently with the program. However, the
Administrator may override state objections to a permit or license
if he finds that the activity is consistent with the objectives of the
Act or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security.218 Because of the leverage gained over federal projects affecting the coastal zone, the federal consistency requirements are clearly
an important incentive to the states to develop programs for final
approval.219 However, until final approval is obtained, federal
depends on the good
consistency with developing state programs
22 0
will of the federal agencies involved.

213. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 40 Fed. Reg. 8546-48 (1975).
If the Administrator shows too much deference to federal agency views,

a state can withdraw its application for program approval without penalty

-state participation in the CZVIvA scheme is voluntary at both the program
development and program implementation stages.
214. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (b) (Supp. IV, 1974); 40 Fed. Reg. 8547-48 (1975).
215. See 40 Fed. Reg. 8547-48 (1975);

HousE

REPoRT 19.

216. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
217. Id.§§ 1456(c) (1), (2).
218. Id. § 1456(c) (3). Without the Act's consistency requirements, fed-

eral activities would be immune from state coastal zone regulation under

the property and supremacy clauses of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV § 3; id. art. VI, cl. 2.

219. See Knecht, Coastal Zone Management--A Federal Perspective, 1

COASTAL

ZONE

MANAGEMENT

J.

123, 127 (1973).

220. 57 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 51-52 (1974); see San Diego Coastwatch v.

The coastal zone extends seaward to the outer limit of the United
States territorial sea, currently three miles, which is also the limit
of state ownership under the Submerged Lands Act. 221 The coastal
zone extends inland only to the extent necessary to control shorelands whose uses "have a direct and significant impact on the
coastal waters," with the exact inland boundary determined by the
state in developing its program. 222 But federally owned lands
within these boundaries -are excluded frorm the coastal zone; 22 8

therefore, federal agencies conducting or supporting activities on
federally owned land are subject to the consistency requirements
only if the activities "directly affect" nonfederally owned land
within the coastal zone. However, licensed activities of nonfederal
entities on federal land still require state certification of program
compliance or override by the Administrator if they affect land and
2 2- 4
water uses in the coastal zone.
Unfortunately, no regulations clarifying the federal 'consistency
requirements have been issued. The legislative history is sparse;
the various overrides of the consistency requirement were a major
concern. When a project inconsistent with an approved state program is alleged to be necessary for national security, the AdminisSchlesinger, No. 74-366-E (S.D. Cal., Aug. 14, 1974), 5 ELR 65254 (Digest
Facsimile Service No. 328, 1975).

221. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 40 Fed. Reg. 1686
(1975). Apparently the seaward limit of the coastal zone for CZMA pur-

poses was initially intended to expand (or contract) with international redefinitions of the territorial sea. See HousE REPORT 13-14; S. REP. No. 92753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) in 3 U.S. CoD CONG. & An. NEws 4783
(1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. But under the Submerged
Lands Act the limit of state ownership is fixed. Thus so long as the coastal
zone is defined as excluding federal lands and the Submerged Lands Act
is not amended, the seaward limit of the CZMA coastal zone will remain
at three miles despite international expansion of the territorial sea. See
CoNFERF cE REPORT 4822, 4824. However, a clarifying amendment reflecting this approach adopted by the Senate was rejected in conference. See
118 CONG. REc. 14185 (1972).
222. 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (a) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 15 C.F.R. § 920.11 (1975);
40 Fed. Reg. 1686 (1975); HousE REPORT 13-14; SENATE REPORT 4783-84; Rob-

bins & Hershman, Boundaries of the Coastal Zone: A Survey of State
Laws, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMIENT J. 305 (1974).
223. 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (a) (Supp. IV, 1974): "Excluded from the coastal
zone are lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion
of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or
agents." By this language Congress apparently intended to exclude all federally owned lands. See CONFERENCE REPORT 4822.
224. The conference report accompanying the CZMA states: ...
Federal lands are not included within a state's coastal zone. As to the use of
such lands which would affect a state's coastal zone, the provisions of section 307(c) [the consistency requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)] would
apply." CONFERENCE REPORT 4822.
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trator is to make an independent inquiry and attempt to "reconcile"
national security needs with the state program 225 He may not simply accept the allegation and allow the inconsistent project to proceed. The Act requires consistency only to the maximum extent
practicable. 220 This language was inserted in recognition of the fact
that all conflicts between federal activities and state programs cannot be foreseen and resolved in the approval process; situations may
arise after approval in which "as a practical matter" complete adherence is prevented. However, the number of such situations anticipated is not large. 227 Thus, the override and maximum extent
practicable provisions authorize variances when technical inconsistencies anise, but they are not loopholes through which federal programs may be driven unimpeded. In any case, federal inconsistencies with approved state programs are to be reported to Congress
228
so it may take corrective measures.
The legislative history also makes clear that the state certification
of compliance requirement for federal licenses and permits applies
only to new activities commenced after the date of enactment. The
distinction is between federal permits for dredging a new channel
and maintaining an old one; the latter permit is not subject to the
certification requirement even if it is granted after the state pro229
gram is approved
Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development
FederalConsistency Requirements
When the CZMA scheme is applied to OCS development, several
225. SENATE REPORT 4793.
226. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c) (1), (2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
227. HOUSE REPORT 20.

228. 16 U.S.C. § 1462(a) (5) (Supp. IV, 1974); CONFERENcE REPORT 4824.
229. SENATE REPORT 4793-94. Professor Hershman has discussed the application of the federal consistency requirements in situations where a federal agency denies a permit for an activity the state finds in compliance
with its approved coastal zone program. Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal

Zone Management and Intergovernmental Cooperation,54 ORE. L. REV. 13,
24-29 (1975). In the energy context, for example, OCS oil and gas development, federal grants, rather than denials, of licenses and permits would
more likely conflict with approved state programs. In cases of conflict,
Professor Hershman recommends that a formal mediation process be available. Id. at 32 n.82. Otherwise the commentators have not explored the
Act's consistency requirements.

points emerge. The federal consistency requirements do not apply
to current OCS leasing activities because no state's program has
been finally approved under the Act.2 0 But as state programs gain
approval, two questions arise: (1) By leasing OCS lands for oil and
gas development, is the federal government "conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone" of a state with an
approved management program? 231 (2) Is an OCS lease a "federal
license or permit to conduct an activity affecting land and water
uses in the coastal zone" of a state with an approved management
2 32
program?
If question (1) is answered yes, consistency with the state program to the maximum extent practicable is required. 23 3 If question
(2) is answered yes, state certification of program compliance is re234
quired before the lease may be granted.
Within each of the foregoing questions is an issue of statutory
interpretation and a question of fact. The issue of statutory interpretation in question (1) appears relatively easy to resolve based
on the plain meaning of the Act's language: by leasing federal OCS
lands for private oil and gas development, the Department of Interior would seem to be "supporting" the activities of the oil company lessees. But before consistency is required, such activities
must directly affect the coastal zone. Although the wells drilled
pursuant to the leases are outside the coastal zone, the coastal zone
is impacted by the many direct effects of drilling discussed above.235
230. The Maine and Washington programs have progressed the furthest
in the approval process at the date of writing. The program approval regulations provide for an optional preliminary approval step, and Washington's program has received such preliminary approval. 40 Fed. Reg. 23778
(1975); see 40 Fed. Reg. 1684 (1975). The shift of Rogers Morton, who promoted OCS oil and gas development as Secretary of Interior, to Secretary
of Commerce with cabinet-level responsibility for CZMA program development was somewhat ironic in this context. The states hope that their CZ1VIA
programs will not be viewed merely as impediments to OCS development
and that attempts will not be made to slow down the program approval
process. Such attempts would lend additional credence to previous allegations that Interior was trying to "beat" the CZMA timetable with its accelerated OCS leasing program.
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
232. Id.§ 1456(c) (3).
233. Id. § 1456(c) (1).
234. Id.§ 1456(c) (3).
235. See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra. The final tract specific
environmental impact statement for southern California appears to concede
the applicability of the CZMA consistency requirement to OCS leasing. See

3 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, PROPosED 1975 OuTER CoN;ENTAL SiiELF Omi. M GAS GENERAL LEAs E SALE
OFFSHORE SouTHERw CAIroRmA 433 (1975). The Resources Agency of Cali-

fornia believes the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 (c)
(1973), also mandates consistency. FnmAL ENVmONBMNTAL STATEMENT,
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States whose coastal zones are directly affected are entitled to consistency with their approved management programs to the maximum extent practicable. In this context consistency would seem
to include following state-designated pipeline and boat and barge
traffic corridors and state locational preferences for onshore facilities. 236 More difficult questions of consistency will have to be negotiated, and if necessary, mediated on a case-by-case basis. Pursuant to the Act, cases of persistent inconsistency should be reported to Congress for resolution.

2 7

Resolution of the issue of statutory interpretation raised by question (2) is more difficult. Licenses and permits, for which the Act
expressly requires state certification of program compliance, are
forms of entitlement to use, and an OCS lease can be viewed in
the same way. However, the Act 238 and congressional deliberations on it239 reflect a concern for protecting federal jurisdiction
supra at 151. The statement in the House Report that the consistency
requirement applies "to any development projects which are undertaken
by a federal agency in the contiguous zone" is puzzling. HousE REPORT 20.
The House version of the consistency requirements clearly referred to
federal agencies conducting or supporting activities "in the coastal zone."
118 CONG. REc. 26502 (1972). An amendment to change the language to
"significantly affecting land use within the coastal zone" was defeated.
Id. at 26493-94. The reference to consistency of federal development in the
continguous zone may be to the coordinated federal contiguous zone management program provided in the House version, which ultimately was
dropped in conference. See id. at 26503. The Act's language--consistency
of federal activities "directly affecting the coastal zone"-first appears in
the conference version. See CONFERENCE REPORT 4824; 118 CONG. REC. 34185
(1972).
236. Recall that as a condition of program approval, state programs are
required to recognize the national interest involved in the siting of facilities
which are other than local in nature and assure that local land and water
use regulations do not unreasonably restrict or exclude land and water uses
of regional benefit. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455(c) (8), (e) (2) (Supp. IV, 1974). The
application of these requirements to OCS development is discussed subsequently. The regulations recognize that a state program may require the
location of pipelines, transmission lines and similar facilities in specific corridors. See 40 Fed. Reg. 1690-91 (1975).
237. 16 U.S.C. § 1462(a) (5) (Supp. IV, 1974) ; CONFERENCE REPORT 4824.
238. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (e) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974) states that nothing in the
act shall diminish federal (or state) jurisdiction over "submerged lands."
See CoNFERECE REPORT 4824.

239. See 118 CoNG. REc. 14180-81, 14183-84, 14185, 26490, 26495, 35548
(1972). Other reflections upon OCS development's relation to the CZMA

have been in connection with facilities siting and program development

over the OCS, particularly the federal proprietary interest, 240 a part
of which is conveyed by an OCS lease.
Judicial resolution of the issue seems likely, for application of the
certification requirement to OCS leases 'offers the states two advantages over the other consistency requirements. First, the requirement of certification gives the states a more precise role 24 1 in the
federal OCS leasing process, in contrast to the negotiation and mediation necessary to enforce the other consistency requirements.
Second, the factual prerequisite for invoking the certification requirement, an effect on land and water uses in the coastal zone,
is perhaps easier to satisfy than the "directly affecting the coastal
zone" test for applying the other consistency requirements. 242 But
consistency is required to the maximum extent practicable whereas
overrides of the certification requirement are possible if the Administrator finds the licensed activity consistent with the objectives of
243
the Act or otherwise necessary to national security.
grants, as discussed subsequently. There are also occasional references to
the need to account for "mineral resources" development in coastal zone
management programs. See, e.g., the statement of President Nixon in signing the Act, 8 WEEKLY CoMP. 1583 (1972); 40 Fed. Reg. 1685 (1975); House
REPoRT 17. Such language was added to the final version of the CZM/IA
program approval regulations proposed in 1974. Compare 40 Fed. Reg. 1688
(1975), with 39 Fed. Reg. 30158 (1974).
240. SEATEA REPORT 4783.

241. The certification procedures are set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c) (3)
(Supp. IV, 1974). Upon notice of an application for a federal permit or
license affecting the coastal zone, the state has six months in which to object, or its concurrence is conclusively presumed. No such license or permit
may be granted without the actual or presumed concurrence of the state
or without a finding by the Administrator that the activity is consistent
with the act or otherwise necessary to national security. Before the Administrator may make such findings, the state must be given a reasonable opportunity to make detailed comments.
242. There may be a contrary implication in the Senate Report, which
describes the certification requirement as applying to "any new activity in
the coastal zone, directly, significantly and adversely affecting the coastal
waters."

SENATE REPORT 4793 (emphasis added).

If this is the test for in-

voking the certification requirement, the granting of an OCS lease, which
can result in oil spills, chronic discharges of pollutants, pipelines and increased marine traffic in adjacent coastal zone waters, would appear to
meet it. OCS leases granted prior to the date of enactment, October 27,
1972, would appear to be exempt from the certification requirement, but
future leases affecting land and water uses in a state (or states) with an
approved management program would be "new activity" requiring certification from each state affected.

See text accompanying note 225 supra.

Similar problems arise under the act in defining the landward extent of
the coastal zone and permissible land and water uses in the coastal zone,
both of which are based on "direct and significant impact on the coastal
waters." 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453 (a), 1454(b) (2) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 15 C.F.R.
§§ 920.11, .12 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 1686-87 (1975).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (3) (Supp. IV, 1974); see text accompanying
note 221 supra.
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The ultimate benefits to the states of applying the certification

requirements to OCS leasing would appear to be the same as the
other consistency requirements-control over such things as pipe244
lines, traffic lanes and the siting of onshore facilities.
FacilitiesSiting
The CZMA was passed with at least some recognition that OCS
development requires facilities in the coastal zones of adjacent
states, both on land and in coastal zone waters. When the Act was
in conference, the offshore oil industry fought successfully for retention of the House facilities siting provision discussed previously.245 The secondary growth induced by OCS development is

another subject to which state programs should address themselves.

24 6

More recently, regulations have been issued addressing the impacts of OCS development on state CZMA programs and allocating
244. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (3) (Supp. IV, 1974) requires certification that
the licensed activity "will be conducted in a manner consistent with the
program."

245. Id. § 1455(c) (8); see Zile, A Legislative-Political History of the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J.
235, 273 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zile]. The offshore oil industry would
have preferred that the Department of the Interior, with which it already
had a working relationship, administer the CZMA. The final House version of the Act placed the CZMA program with the Department of the Interior, but in conference the program was returned to Commerce. See CoNFERENCE REPORT 4822-23; Zile 271-73. Related ideas were deferring
action on the CZMA in favor of comprehensive national land use legislation
administered by the Department of the Interior and transporting concepts
from such legislation into the CZMA; both of these proposals failed. See
id.; 118 CONG. REc. 26482, 26494 (1972). However, the oil industry exercised
its influence successfully in other ways. A provision for federal OCS sanctuaries adjacent to state estuarine sanctuaries was deleted at the request
of offshore oil interests. Zile 273. In addition, a provision for a $500,000
study of the environmental hazards of OCS drilling in the Atlantic Ocean
was quietly dropped in conference. Id.; see 118 CONG. REc. 14176-82, 14191,
35547-50 (1972).
246. Knecht, Coastal Zone Management--A Federal Perspective, 1
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 123, 126 (1973). The comment to 40 Fed.
Reg. 1685 (1975), states that
development outside the coastal zone may often have a significant
impact in the coastal zone and create a range of public problems
and issues which must be dealt with in the coastal zone management program.
See also COMMSSION ON M&RINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR
NATION AND TaE SEA 127 (1969).

funds for OCS impact planning by the states.247 On the one hand,
the regulations urge a regional 248 approach by the states involved
without specifying a particular procedure; on the other hand, they
240
urge redistribution of the funds to impacted local governments.
2
0
Facilities siting aspects are stressed throughout. 1 In a key paragraph, the Act's requirement of recognition of the national interest
in facilities siting is interpreted as meaning that
[s]tates may not arbitrarily exclude or restrict the siting of facilities deemed to be of greater than statewide significance. In
locations where regional groupings of States are likely to be
affected, it is important that one State not be called upon to bear
the entire regional burden of such facilities, nor should it expect
to receive all of the benefits of such development. Siting decisions in such cases should be taken in the context of a broad
regional approach which assesses both economic and social needs,
environmental considerations and public desires in the affected
States. 251

From a state's rights point of view, the regulations can be interpreted as saying that so long as a state accounts for its regional
fair share of OCS onshore facilities, the state may determine where
the facilities are to be located. In addition to preserving a measure
of federalism in OCS decision-making, this approach distributes the
benefits and burdens fairly within a region.

This regional fair

share concept could also be useful in resolving other federal-state
energy development conflicts.
However, several problems must be solved before it can be utilized in OCS or other energy development situations. As with regional environmental impact statements, appropriate regional
boundaries must be selected. The region's share must be determined before the fair shares of states within the region can be
established. Here the lack of a national energy plan is again a stumbling block: determining regional shares without such a plan is
difficult if not impossible. In the national plan the factors to be
weighed in determining regional and state fair shares should be
specified. The regulation quoted above suggests four factors: economic and social needs, environmental aspects (such as existing
pollution loads, uniqueness of environmental resources), and public
attitudes in the affected areas. To these should be added, on a re247. 40 Fed. Reg. 23276-78 (1975).
248. The term "regional" can have two meanings in a United States planning context. The one intended by these regulations is an interstate approach, but for larger states at least "regional" can also refer to suitable
subareas of the state.
249. 40 Fed. Reg. 23276-77 (1975).
250. See, e.g., id. at 23277.
251. Id. at 23276.
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gional and state basis, energy supply and demand, contribution to
defense and food supply, and
other national needs such as national
2 52
basic statistics such as population
The states should develop criteria for siting the facilities included
in their fair shares. Economic feasibility must be considered or unacceptable siting decisions may result.253 With regard to OCS oil
and gas and other coastal dependent energy programs, the Coastal
Zone Management Act provides a process for developing state siting criteria. 254 The question remains whether the CZMA process

is preferable to other systems for siting energy facilities.
OTHER MODELS FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING

Deepwater PortAct of 1974
The Deepwater Port Act of 1974255 is the first federal legislation
which explicitly attempts to account for national, regional, state,
local and environmental interests in energy development. Deepwater ports are offshore facilities for loading and unloading oil,
principally imported oil transported by supertankers,255 which are
too large for conventional United States harbor facilities. 25 7 The
252. See id. at 1688.

253. The outlines of a system for making feasible siting decisions with
the least environmental impact are sketched in Note, The Least Adverse
Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 lHARv. L. REV.
735, 750-56 (1975). Additional suggestions for state onshore impact planning are offered in COASTAL MANAGEAMNT OF TH OCS 51-59.
254. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CovMssIoNs, PaRiUMTARY
COASTAL PLAN 199-243 (Hearing Draft, March 1975).
255. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126; see Note, 5
ELR 50043 (1975); Comment, 3 ELR 10165 (1973). The deepwater port regulations appear at 40 Fed. Reg. 52540 (1975).
256. Substantial subsidies are available for the construction of supertankers in the U.S. See 46 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973). Construction
standards for domestic vessels engaged in trade from one U.S. port to another are specified in regulations under the Port and Waterways Safety Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 427 (July 10, 1972). See 39 Fed. Reg. 24150
(1974); Note, 5 ELR 50043, 50044, 50047 (1975). For U.S. vessels in foreign
trade and foreign vessels entering U.S. waters, the standards are set by international convention. See ENVImONwm AL LAw INsTrrUTE, FEDERAL ExVmONMETAL LAW 645-49 (1974).
257. The United States has no developed harbor capable of handling
tankers in the 150,000 deadweight-tons (dwt) class, the size of a small supertanker or very large crude carrier (VLCC). Deepwater ports would be
designed for supertankers up to 500,000 dwt. ENVIRONvMNTAL LAW IwsTITuTE, FEDERAL ENVIONiMTAL LAw 673-74 (1974).

need for deepwater ports and supertankers is tied to the success
of OCS and other domestic oil development and conservation programs. United States self-sufficiency in oil obviates the need for
foreign oil transported by supertankers to United States deepwater
ports.258 Deepwater ports and oil and gas development are potentially conflicting uses of the OCS. OCS waters should be zoned
where necessary to keep supertankers and drilling platforms a safe
distance apart. Location of a deepwater port near OCS oil and gas
deposits also significantly increases the impacts on adjacent states.
As -with OCS development, states oppose deepwater ports for their
onshore impacts. Opposition to deepwater ports is not as strong,
for supertankers using deepwater ports are an improvement over
smaller tankers using conventional harbors, and the projected number of deepwater ports is small. 259 A few states are even seeking
location of deepwater ports off their coasts.
Under the Deepwater Port Act, the Secretary of Transportation
controls licensing of deepwater ports more than three miles offshore. 260 The Act grants each significantly affected coastal state
a veto over the license. 261 A license also cannot be issued if the
port would violate federal pollution laws.2 2 Facilities for which
licenses are granted must utilize the "best available technology" to
minimize environmental impacts and must operate consistently
with state environmental protection programs.2 63 Should a threat
to the environment arise, the Secretary of Transportation may or258. Supertankers and west coast deepwater ports could also be used to
transport Alaskan oil to the lower 48 states.
259. See id. at 675-76; Ludwigson, Coastal Zone Management, A Whole
New Ballgame, BNA ENviR. REP. MoNoGRApu

No. 18 at 3 (1974).

Up to

250,000 dwt, there are also significant cost savings in transporting oil long

distances by supertanker. See AssniBLv SELECT CoMMrT
PORTS, DEEPWATER PORTS iN CALroRNIA 24-25 (1974).

oN

DEEPWATER

260. Deepwater port components within three miles of shore are subject
to existing federal and state regulations. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), in 4 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 7562 (1974). Licensing
and regulation of deepwater ports entirely within the three-mile limit are
left to the adjacent coastal state.
261. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 4(c) (9). Veto power is
granted to all states within 15 miles of the proposed port or directly connected by pipeline to it and .to those with an equivalent risk of damage.
Id. § 9 (a). Where there are competing applications for a license, preference
is given to applications from nearby coastal states or their political subdivisions. Id. § 5 (i) (2).
262. Id. § 4(b) (6). A deepwater port is treated as a "new source" for
purposes of the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA. Id. § 3 (10). Compliance
with the Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (Supp. I1, 1973), is also
required. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 4(b) (6). Similar compliance by onshore facilities related to the port is required by existing law.
263. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, §§ 4(b) (5), 9(b) (1).
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der port operations suspended immediately; should he fail to take
action in such a situation, a citizen suit may be brought to enforce
suspension. 264 When oil spills do occur, liability without fault,
26 5
backed by a Deepwater Port Liability Fund, is imposed.

The Act gives special attention to the onshore impacts of deepwater ports. Applicants for a license must disclose the onshore
facilities required by their proposal.266 The effects of land-based
development related to deepwater port development must be evalu2 67
ated in the NEPA impact statement prepared for the proposal.
The quantity of onshore development stimulated by a deepwater
port can be restricted by limiting the annual throughput of the
port.2 68 States having tank farms and pipelines connected to the

deepwater port can collect fees to compensate for the "environmental and administrative costs attributable to the construction and op26 9
eration" of the deepwater port and land based facilities.
Moreover, the Coastal Zone Management Act is not ignored. No
license may be granted unless the coastal state directly connected
to the port by pipeline is developing a CZMA program covering
the affected areas.2 7 The CZMA is recognized as the principal vehicle for controlling the port's onshore impacts and accommodating
2 71
port development interests with other coastal-related interests.
264. Id. §§ 12(b), 16. The court in its discretion may award attorney
and expert witness fees. Id. § 12 (d).
265. Id. §§ 18(d), (e), (f). These provisions are patterned after similar
provisions in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653
(Supp. H, 1973). See S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7543 (1974). The states are not preempted
by either act from imposing additional liabilities. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-627, § 18(k)(1); 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9) (Supp. EII, 1973); see
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
266. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 5 (c) (2).
267. Id. §§ 5(f), 6(a) (5).
268. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) in 4 U.S. CODE CONG.
Throughput limits might lead to an increase
& AD. NEws 7567 (1975).
in the number of ports proposed.
269. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 5(h) (2); see H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 93-1605, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975), in 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7633 (1975).
270. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, §§ 4(c) (10), 9(c). The requirement is weak in that continued development and eventual approval
of the program are not required. See S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), in 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7539-40 (1974).
271. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in 4 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws, 7539-40 (1974); ,Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Man-

If necessary, the states can veto deepwater port proposals to protect
the integrity of their coastal zone programs.
In sum, the Deepwater Port Act reflects the growth of environmental consciousness since 1953, when the OCS Lands Act was
passed. 27 2 It contains several features which will undoubtedly be
considered in reforming the OCS Lands Act. The most striking is
the state veto over deepwater port development. However, a similar veto over OCS development is probably not workable. In part,
Congress accepted state veto of deepwater ports because some states
were clearly enthusiastic about ports located off their coasts. 278
OCS development has not been greeted with such enthusiasm, and
occasionally state officials have admitted that a state veto over OCS
development could lead to serious frustration of national energy
274

needs.

PreemptiveFederalSiting of Energy Facilities
With respect to environmental protection and energy development, the limits on federal power have not been precisely determined. Nevertheless, congressional power over commerce probably
encompasses legislation determining the location of energy facilities
even over state objections.2 75 An example is Senate bill 619,276
ment and Intergovernmental Cooperation, 54 ORE. L. REv. 13, 22 (1975).
However, in Louisiana the deepwater port development effort so far has
outpaced the CZMA program development effort. Neither act is clear as
to whether the CZMA state certification of program compliance requirement
also applies to licenses granted under the Deepwater Port Act. If it does,
activities pursuant to the deepwater port license are required to be consistent with approved state CZMA programs. See S. REP. No. 92-753, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), in 3 U.S. CODE Coxr. & AD. NEws 4793-94 (1972).
The deepwater port regulations assume the certification requirement applies. See 40 Fed. Reg. 52556 (1975).
272. The Deepwater Port Act orders the Secretary of Transportation to
regulate the safe construction and operation of oil pipelines on the OCS,
whether for deepwater ports or OCS development, because of previous
jurisdictional confusion among federal agencies. Act of Jan. 3, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-627, § 21.
273. See S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7537-38 (1974).
274. E.g., 6 BNA Evrm. REP. CURRENT Dvm"LOPvmrs 345 (1975); see 5
id. 1274-75 (1974). But see id. at 1408-09 (1975).
275. See ENVmONMETAL LAw INSTITuTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
38-39, 852-60 (1974); cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435
(1955) (state regulation of FPC-licensed hydroelectric dam preempted);
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd
per curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (state regulation of radioactive waste discharge from federally licensed nuclear power plant preempted). But see
HOUSE Co1n1arrTE

ON THE JUDICIARY, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OnM AND

GAs, Serial No. 93-31, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 186 (1974).
276. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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which authorizes federal energy facilities planning for a state if the
state does not develop a satisfactory plan. Such legislation reflects
impatience with the delays and costs of today's multiple procedures
at several levels of government. However, expediting the approval
process is a short-term energy measure only; it does not fulfill the
need for comprehensive long-range planning. 277 Furthermore, recent federal legislation, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act,
has sought not to preempt but rather to strengthen the role of the
states in land use control. It might prove administratively impossible to pull energy facility siting questions up to the federal level
without bringing the myriad of other land use decisions along with
them 278

The fact that neither house of Congress has passed a federal facilities siting bill suggests that federal preemption of siting is politically infeasible at this time.27 However, the possibility stands
as a warning to the states to be reasonable in their demands for
a role in decisions concerning federal energy resources. As one observer has commented about preemptive federal siting: "Apparently, when the problem is perceived as serious enough, no amount
of past rhetoric about states' rights will stand in the way of federal
2 80
action.
IMPROVING

OCS DECIsIoN-MAKING

Many suggestions short of federal preemption or a state veto have
been offered for improving OCS development decision-making.
From the states' point of view, a principal problem is that currently their rights are basically procedural. For example, they may
require preparation of an adequate NEPA impact statement prior
277. See Binder, The Energy Crisis, The Environment and the Con-

sumer: A Solomonian Task, 1 OHIO NORTH. L. REv. 215, 264 (1974).
278. INTERAGENCY STUDY TEAMT FmERAL ENERGY REGULATION STUDY 3334 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1974); see N.Y. C= BAR, SPECIAL CowvnvnT=
ox ELEcTRic PowER AD

THE ENVIRONiviENT, ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRON-

MVENT 271-72 (1972).
279. See SPECIAL COnm1WEEE oN ENVmONmENAL LAW Or TEE AMECA
BAR ASSOCIATION, INDuSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMNT

ch. 1,

at 5 (1973).

See also Power Plant Siting-An Overview of Litigation and
Legislation,BNA ENVm. REP. MONOGRAPH No. 15 (1973).

280. ENVmONMENTAL
65 n.163 (1974).

LAW INSTITUTE, FEDEmAL ENVIOmNTAL LAw 1464-

to the Department of the Interior's leasing decision.
Exercising
such rights may only delay the decision, not change it. The CZMA
requirement of consistency with approved state coastal zone programs is not available to the coastal states yet because they are still
in the process of developing their programs.
The suggested improvements include OCS lease provisions requiring lessees to conform with state regulations protecting state offshore resources and controlling onshore impacts, 281 combining
leased tracts into larger units for development purposes, 282 and
replacing private exploration for OCS oil and gas deposits with federal exploration. 28 3 However, suggestions for separating exploration
of a tract from its development have received the greatest attention.28 4 This separation can be merely a "pause" while the lessee
prepares and circulates to the affected states a development plan
for the resources discovered; or it can be legal separation of the
right to develop from the right to explore, with perhaps a preference for awarding development to the exploring company if, after
impact analysis, the Department of the Interior decides to develop
-the resources. Under either approach, disputes between the Department of the Interior and the states on whether and how to develop the resources would be subject to arbitration or judicial resolution.285 Development should be separated from exploration in
order to give the states time to plan and mitigate the impacts of
development, which depend greatly on the size and location of the
deposits discovered and on the rate they are extracted. The Department of the Interior is wary of separating exploration from development, for separation could delay OCS oil and gas production. 28

Numerous bills have been introduced in the Ninety-Fourth Congress to amend the OCS Lands Act, the CZMA or both to incorpo281. 1 CEQ REPORT 210.

282. Such unitization would aid assessment of the cumulative impacts of
OCS development. See 2 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONmENTAL STATEMENT, PROPOSED 1975 OUTm

CovriNEAL SHELF Omr AND GAS

GmNmm LEASE SALE OFFSHORE SOUTHERN CAIonNrA 753, 756-57 (1975).
283. Interior believes that competitive private exploration yields more
discoveries. 5 BNA ENvm. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1841 (1975).
284. See Lee, Decision to Lease Outer Continental Shelf Lands, 2 COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEAMNT J. 31, 40-45 (1975). For coal mining on public lands
administered by Interior, there is a separation of the exploration and devel-

opment decisions. See Sierra Club v. Morton (Great Plains Coal), 514 F.2d

856, 865 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
285. See 6 BNA ENvni. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 345-46 (1975).
286. See 5 id. 1840-41 (1975). Legal separation of exploration and development rights could radically alter the bids received; bids for development rights to tracts with known resources would of course be much higher.

[VOL. 13: 253, 1976]

Where Energy Meets the Environment
SAN DIEGO LAW RLVIW

rate features of the Deepwater Port Act and suggestions of the commentators. 28 7 As of December 1975, the leading contenders for
enactment were Senate bill 521288 and Senate bill 586,289 amending
the OCS Lands Act and CZMA respectively; both passed the Senate
in July 1975. Although neither bill gives coastal states a veto over
OCS development, the states' role in the decision-making process
is increased considerably, impacts are compensated, and federal
preemption of energy facilities siting is avoided.
Senate bill 586 adds to the CZMA a comprehensive program of
financial support to coastal states impacted by energy resource development and facility siting. If the net impacts on the state 'over
the life of a project are adverse, grants are authorized; if adverse
impacts are temporary and net benefits to the state are expected,
loans are available. However, states impacted by OCS development
are entitled to grants without a showing of net adverse impacts.
Grants and loans may be used to provide public facilities and services necessitated by the project as well as to compensate for adverse
impacts. Impact planning grants and state and local impact bond
guarantees are also available. Funds received for any of the above
purposes may be reallocated by the state to local governments.
The strings attached to impact funds are minimal-satisfactory
progress in CZMA program development and use of impact funds
consistent with the program. Senate bill 586 also requires inclusion
of an energy facilities planning process in CZMA programs. The
emphasis here is on planning; state enactment of energy facility siting legislation is not required, and federal review of individual siting decisions is specifically negated in the bill. The bill reaffirms
the principle of federal consistency with approved state CZMA programs and subjects federal leasing activities to state certification
of program compliance.
Senate bill 521 amends the OCS Lands Act to provide grants from
OCS revenues to coastal states impacted by OCS development.
Funds granted may be used to provide public facilities and services
287. As of August 1975, over 40 such bills had been introduced in the
House alone.
288. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 17, 1975), titled the Outer Continental
Shelf Management Act of 1975. A similar measure passed the Senate in
1974.
289. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 16, 1975), titled the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1975.

and may be reallocated by the states to local governments. A $100
million fund is divided among the impacted states according to the
state's share of OCS acreage leased, wells drilled, oil and gas landed,
OCS employment and onshore capital investment related to OCS
development. To the extent net adverse impacts exceed the state's

share of the fund, the Secretary of Interior may grant additional
amounts. To be eligible the states must establish offshore pollution
containment and cleanup systems, and all grants are coordinated
with state CZMA programs.
Senate bill 521 attempts to avoid or mitigate the impacts of OCS
development by requiring environmental baseline studies and monitoring, evaluation in NEPA impact statements of onshore effects including effects on coastal zone programs, onshore planning information from federal -agencies, and improvements in safety on the OCS.
Citizen suits are authorized to enforce these obligations, and strict
liability is imposed for oil spills.
Senate bill 521 also attempts to enlarge the role of the coastal
states in OCS decision-making. After 1977, OCS leasing is to proceed under a five-year program prepared by the Department of the
Interior consistent with approved state CZMA programs. Effective
immediately, prior to development and production on a tract, the
lessee must prepare and submit for public hearings a development
plan which discloses the -onshore facilities needed if development
proceeds and which is consistent with approved state CZMA programs. The Secretary of Interior's approval of five-year programs
and development plans is judicially reviewable.
Both Senate bill 521 and Senate bill 586 emphasize consistency
of OCS development with approved state CZMA programs. 290 Senate bill 586 covers other coastal energy programs as well. Both determine net adverse impacts on a statewide basis but allow the
states to redistribute impact funds to local governments; neither defines which impacts are adverse. 291 They disagree as to who shall
distribute impact funds, the Secretary of Interior (Senate bill 521)
or the Secretary of Commerce (Senate bill 586). The formal OCS
tract development plan required by Senate bill 521 may be the
"pause" between exploration and development that some commentators are requesting, but it certainly is not a complete separation
of the exploration and development decisions. Overall, Senate bill
290. S. 586 goes further by expressly providing that certification of program compliance is required for federal "leases" as well as for federal
licenses and permits.
291. One sometimes discovers there are "adverse benefits" accompanying
growth and development.
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586 probably has the best chance for enactment: its reforms, which
are limited to the CZMA, steer clear of the Department of the Interior and oil industry resistance to change in the OCS Lands
Act.292
CONCLUSION

Recent energy development issues probably have placed the
greatest strain on federal-state relations since school integration.
There is no single answer to energy questions. What is needed is
a decision-making process which accounts for the various interests
at stake in reaching feasible solutions to our energy problems. The
two extremes among the models available are the Deepwater Port
Act, which accords the states a veto, and preemptive federal siting
of energy facilities. However, for energy programs with coastal
impacts, the CZMA process seems the desirable course. The CZMA
preserves federalism in energy decisions, emphasizing the role of
the states as mediator between the national and local levels of government. Unlike the Deepwater Port Act, the CZMA process can
be utilized for a variety of energy problems. The CZMA is flexible
enough to encompass particular solutions, such as separation of exploration and development of the OCS. Furthermore, the CZMA
process has already been established. Most proposals before Congress are aimed at strengthening rather than replacing it. Use of
the CZMA process for coastal energy questions will test the viability of federalism in energy decisions.

292. See, e.g., 6 BNA ENVm. REP. CuRmENT DEVELoPMaENTs 360-61 (1975).

